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Abstract
In this paper we analyze the two-period consumption-investment decision of a house-
hold with prospect theory preferences and an endogenous second period reference level
which captures habit persistence in consumption and in the current consumption reference
level. In particular, we examine three types of household depending on how the house-
hold’s current consumption reference level relates to a given threshold which is equal to
the average discounted endowment income. The first type of household has a relatively
low reference level (less ambitious household) and can avoid relative consumption losses
in both periods. The second type of household (balanced household) always consumes
exactly its reference levels. The third type of household has a relatively high reference
level (more ambitious household) and cannot avoid to incur relative consumption losses,
either now or in the future. Note that these households may act very differently from
one another and thus there will often be a diversity of behavior. For all three types we
examine how the household reacts to changes in: income (e.g., income fall caused by
recession or taxation of endowment income), persistence to consumption, the first period
reference level and the degree of loss aversion. Among others we find that the household
increases its exposure to risky assets in good economic times if it is less ambitious and in
bad economic times if it is more ambitious. We also find that in some cases more income
can lead to less happiness. In addition, the less ambitious household and the more ambi-
tious household with a higher time preference will be less happy with a rising persistence
in consumption while the more ambitious household with a lower time preference will be
happier if it sticks more to its consumption habits. Finally, the household will be happiest
for the lowest possible current consumption reference level, i.e., not comparing at all will
lead to the highest level of happiness.
Keywords: prospect theory, loss aversion, consumption-savings decision, portfolio allo-
cation, happiness, income effects
JEL classification: G02, G11, E20
1 Introduction
One of the most important decisions households face is consumption today versus consump-
tion in the future. Households transfer current consumption into the future by allocating their
savings into different types of assets some of which are riskier than others. These decisions
are done with the knowledge that the future is risky. The expected utility theory (EUT) has
been the cornerstone model for exploring these household decisions. This research deviates
from the EUT model and explores, in a two-period model, the behavior of households which
are characterized by reference dependent preferences (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky
and Kahneman, 1992) and by habit persistence (Abel, 1990; Campbell and Cochrane, 1999;
Constantinides, 1990; Flavin and Nakagawa, 2008; Pagel, 2017) when deciding on consump-
tion, savings, and the portfolio allocation of savings. We explore the factors that influence
a household’s consumption, savings and portfolio decisions when the second period reference
level is assumed to depend on first period consumption and the first period consumption refer-
ence level. Households have been observed to show a habit for consumption that persists into
the future, and hence a habit persistence model combined with prospect theory preferences
will provide new insights on such important life cycle decisions.
By incorporating prospect theory type of preferences and habit persistence we will be able
to address a number of issues on consumption and risk taking behavior that have not been
explored in the literature previously. How does a household make intertemporal decisions
under these two behavioral traits? Does the optimal solution depend on avoiding relative
losses or not? Does the optimal choice depend on whether the household is sufficiently loss
averse? Is the choice dependent on the household being less or more ambitious on targets?
How do the second period reference level, consumption, risk taking, and happiness change
when the first period reference level changes? Do the responses depend on the household’s level
of ambition? What impact does the habit persistence in consumption have on consumption
and portfolio choice? How will a household react to sudden income changes? Do happiness,
current consumption and risk taking always increase when income increases? This paper will
attempt to shed some light on the above questions.
The first reference levels ever used in economic research were developed by Stone (1954)
and Geary (1950). The Stone-Geary utility preferences involve reference dependent utility on
subsistence levels of consumption and thus subsistence levels can be considered as a special
type of reference points. Under such preferences households derive utility from consumption in
excess of a subsistence level. Savings and portfolio choices with subsistence consumption have
been explored by Achury et al. (2012).1 They use a Stone-Geary expected utility model to
explain the empirical observations that rich people show a higher savings rate, higher holdings
1Merton (1969, 1971) used HARA preferences to examine savings and portfolio allocations in an infinite
horizon expected utility model. Achury et al. (2012) added subsistence and also habit persistence to Merton’s
CRRA utility function (a subset of HARA preferences).
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of risky assets as a fraction of personal wealth, and face a higher volatility in consumption.
Another model that has been used is habit persistence. This model assumes that house-
holds derive satisfaction from consumption relative to a reference level which in turn depends
on past consumption levels. Thus current consumption affects not only a household’s current
marginal utility but also its marginal utility in the next period, which may explain why the
more a household consumes today the more it will want to consume tomorrow. The macroeco-
nomics and finance literature uses habit persistence models to explain many puzzles, e.g., the
equity premium puzzle (Abel, 1990; Constantinides, 1990; Campbell and Cochrane, 1999),
excess consumption smoothing (Lettau and Uhlig, 2000) and many business cycle patterns
(Boldrin et al., 2001; Christiano et al., 2005).
Reference levels are also used to compare one’s own consumption levels to others (Falk and
Knell, 2004; Hlouskova, Fortin and Tsigaris, 2017). Many households are influenced by the
self-enhancement motive while others are determined by the self-improvement motive. The
self-enhancement motive applies when people want to feel they are better than their peers
and set their references at low levels possibly reflecting the wealth of poorer people. Others
with a high reference level place importance to the self-improvement motive and compare
themselves with the ones who are more successful. Hlouskova, Fortin and Tsigaris (2017) use
a two-period life-cycle model with a sufficiently loss averse household to investigate the impact
of these psychological traits on consumption, savings, portfolio decisions, as well as on welfare.
They find that the optimal solution depends on whether the household’s present value of the
consumption reference levels is below, equal to, or above the present value of its endowment
income. When reference levels are below the endowment income the authors associate this
with the self-enhancement motive. Under this motive the household wants to avoid relative
losses in consumption in any present or future state of nature (good or bad). Hence the degree
of loss aversion does not affect optimal first period consumption and risky asset holdings.
When reference levels are equal to the endowment income this is linked to the belonging
motive (i.e., the sufficiently loss averse household belonging to a similar social class). They
find that the sufficiently loss averse household’s first period consumption is the exogenous
reference consumption level and such households avoid playing the stock market. Finally,
reference levels above the endowment income are connected with the self-improvement motive.
Households with such high reference levels cannot avoid to consume below the reference level,
either now or in the future. In this case loss aversion affects consumption and risky investment
negatively. The current study differs from Hlouskova, Fortin and Tsigaris (2017) in that it
incorporates habit persistence into the household’s behavior.
Close to our work is also a recent paper by van Bilsen et al. (2017) who investigate
optimal consumption and portfolio choice paths of a loss averse household with an endogenous
reference level. The uncertainty arises from risky assets and it is assumed that the time is
continuous. Mainly due to loss aversion, the household’s behavior is geared towards protecting
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itself against bad states of nature to avoid or to reduce losses. Consumption choices are found
to adjust slowly to financial shocks. In addition, welfare losses are found to be substantial
given consumption and portfolio selections are suboptimal. Curatola (2015) also analyzes
optimal consumption-savings decisions of a loss averse household with a time varying reference
level in a continuous-time framework and finds that a loss averse household can consume
below the reference level in bad economic times. This is done in order to invest in risky assets
and increase the likelihood that in the future consumption exceeds its reference level. This
behavioral approach can explain why investors increase their exposure to risky assets during
financial crises. In contrast, standard habit persistence models do not allow consumption to
be below the reference level. Our research complements the work by van Bilsen et al. (2017)
and Curatola (2015) in that it provides additional insights: as our model is a two-period life-
cycle model we can derive closed-form solutions which allow us to conduct comparative static
analysis to detect why certain adjustments happen and also to conduct a welfare analysis.
In this paper, we find closed-form solutions for consumption and risk taking of a loss averse
household whose endogenous second period reference level depends on current consumption
(habit persistence) and on reference consumption. Households who have a relatively low first
period reference level are more conservative (less ambitious), which allows them to achieve
relative gains in both periods in both states of nature. Households who have a relatively high
first period reference level and a low discount factor are more adventurous (more ambitious)
and will thus face relative losses in the bad state of nature in the second period while they
will achieve relative gains in the first period and in the good state of nature in the second pe-
riod. On the other hand more ambitious households who value future consumption relatively
more will have first period consumption below the reference level but will maintain future
consumption in both states of nature above the endogenous second period reference level. We
then conduct comparative statics and examine how these different types of households react
to income changes, to changes in the first period reference level, to changes in loss aversion,
and to changes in habit persistence.
The main difference with respect to Hlouskova, Fortin and Tsigaris (2017), henceforth
called HFT, is that this study considers also habit persistence. An increase in the consumption
habit persistence will reduce current consumption but stimulate risk taking for less ambitious
households, reduce both current consumption and risk taking for more ambitious households
with a high time preference, and stimulate both current consumption and risk taking for more
ambitious households with a low time preference. In addition, we analyze income effects, which
are closely related to the effects of income taxes. Another difference between this study and
HFT is that the response of first and second period consumption of less ambitious households
to a change of the first period reference level is ambiguous. Finally, unlike in HFT we also
consider here a scarcity constraint on consumption, i.e., the consumption in both periods can
not fall below a certain value.
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Note that the household’s first period reference level may be interpreted to equal the first
period consumption of a reference household, the Joneses. Then following the Joneses2 means
that an increase of first period consumption of the Joneses will also trigger an increase of this
household’s first period consumption.3 In HFT the less ambitious household and the more
ambitious household with a high time preference (low discount factor) do follow the Joneses,
while the more ambitious household with a low time preference (high discount factor) does
not. In this study the behavior of the more ambitious household is similar, while that of
the less ambitious household may be similar or different, depending on the household’s time
preference: for a lower time preference (larger discount factor) the household does follow the
Joneses (like in HFT), while for a higher time preference it does not. The rest of the results
are somewhat similar to HFT in terms of the impact of the exogenous parameters on the
choice variables but differ in terms of magnitude.
Another interesting result that was not elaborated in HFT is the reaction of the choice
variables of the household to income changes. When focusing, for instance, on risk taking
then less ambitious households reduce risk taking when their income falls while more ambi-
tious households increase risk taking when their income shrinks, which is consistent with the
observation that investors increase their exposure to risky assets during financial crises (see
Curatola, 2015). Finally, the same finding as in HFT is that the highest utility is achieved
for the lowest current consumption reference level (while keeping everything else unchanged).
Thus, not comparing at all (e.g., to others) leads to the highest level of happiness.
In the next section we present the model and lay out the methodology used to find the
solutions. Section 3 presents the main results with a discussion and investigates the impact
of income taxation. Finally, we offer some concluding remarks.
2 The two-period consumption-investment model
2.1 Model set-up
Consider a household who decides on current and future consumption within a two-period
model. In the first period it decides how to allocate a non-stochastic exogenous income,
Y1 > 0, to current consumption, C1, risk-free investment, m, and risky investment, α ≥ 0:
Y1 = C1 +m+ α = C1 + S (1)
Savings are composed of the risk-free investment and the risky investment, i.e., S = m + α.
The net of the dollar return rf > 0 represents the yield from the safe asset. The risky asset
yields a stochastic net of the dollar return r. We assume two states of nature, good and bad.
2See Clark et al. (2008) and Falk and Knell (2004), among others.
3This will work through the household’s first period reference level which is equal to the Joneses’ first period
consumption.
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The good state of nature occurs with probability p while the bad state of nature occurs with
probability 1− p. In the good state the risky asset yields net return rg and in the bad state
it yields net return rb. Furthermore, it is assumed that −1 < rb < rf < rg, 0 < p < 1, and
the expected return of the risky asset is greater than the return of the safe asset, namely
E(r) = p rg + (1 − p)rb > rf . In the second period (e.g., retirement years in a two-period
life-cycle model) the household consumes
C2s = Y2 + (1 + rf )m+ (1 + rs)α
where Y2 ≥ 0 is the non-stochastic income in the second period (e.g., government pension
income) and s ∈ {b, g}. Note that C2g ≥ C2b as α ≥ 0 and rg > rb, where C2g is the second
period household’s consumption in the good state of nature and C2b in the bad state of nature.
The household is allowed to consume the non stochastic future income Y2 in the first period,
as long as consumption exceeds its scarcity constraint in either period (i.e., C1 ≥ CL ≥ 0 and
C2s ≥ (1 + rf )CL) and savings are negative. Hence, the household can partially borrow from
the risk-free asset m against its future income. The gross return from total investments is
equal to (1 + rf )m+ (1 + rs)α, s ∈ {b, g}. Based on this and (1) consumption in the second
period for s ∈ {b, g} is
C2s = Y2 + (1 + rf )(Y1 − C1) + (rs − rf )α (2)
Preferences are described by the following reference based utility function
U(C1, α) = V (C1 − C¯1) + δ V (C2 − C¯2) (3)
C¯1 is the first period exogenous consumption reference (or comparison) level, which can be
viewed, for instance, as the first period consumption of the Joneses (a reference household
to which our household compares to) or their income or, alternatively, as a fraction of this
household’s income. The first two types of reference level are examples of an external reference
level, which relates to, e.g., people in the same neighborhood, region or country, or people
with distinct demographic features, while the third one is an example of an internal reference
level, which depends on, e.g., one’s own income or one’s own past consumption, see Clark et
al. (2008). C¯2 is the second period endogenous reference level given such that
C¯2 = (1 + rf )
[
wC1 + (1− w)C¯1
]
(4)
where w ∈ [0, 1]. Note that the second period endogenous reference level depends on the first
period consumption and the first period consumption reference level. The weight w shows
the influence of the current consumption upon the future reference level. A higher w implies
a stronger dependence between the future reference level and the current consumption level.
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The weight w reflects thus the consumer’s persistence to consumption habits. The weight (1−
w), on the other hand, determines the dependence of the second period consumption reference
level on the first period consumption reference level. This can be seen as a habit persistence
in consumption reference levels. The two weights are negatively related to each other, i.e., an
increased habit persistence on current consumption implies a lower habit persistence on the
first period reference level, and vice versa. The same habit-formation reference consumption
level was used also in Fuhrer (2000). The assumption on the determination of the second
period reference level is the main difference between this model and the one developed and
analyzed in Hlouskova, Fortin and Tsigaris (2017) where the second period reference level
was exogenous.
The δ is the discount factor, 0 < δ < 1, and will play an important role in the optimal
solutions. A higher δ places more importance to the future relative to the presence, i.e., the
household shows a lower time preference, while a smaller δ puts more weight to the presence,
i.e., the household shows a higher time preference. The V (·) is a prospect theory (S-shaped)
value function defined as
V (Ci − C¯i) =


(Ci−C¯i)
1−γ
1−γ , Ci ≥ C¯i
−λ (C¯i−Ci)
1−γ
1−γ , Ci < C¯i

 (5)
for i ∈ {1, 2}, see Figure 1. Parameter λ > 1 represents the degree of loss aversion, while
γ ∈ (0, 1) represents diminishing sensitivity to consumption. Consumption in excess of the
reference level represents a (relative) gain of the magnitude Ci − C¯i, while consumption
below the reference level represents a (relative) loss of the magnitude equal to C¯i −Ci. Note
that the value function is non-differentiable at the consumption reference level and is steeper
in the domain of losses than in the domain of gains. This implies that there is a higher
dissatisfaction from a reduction in consumption when the household is in the domain of losses
than dissatisfaction from the same size of decline in consumption when the household is in
the domain of gains. Finally, the household is risk averse in the domain of relative gains (i.e.,
the value function is concave when consumption exceeds the reference level) and risk seeking
in the domain of relative losses (i.e., the value function is convex when consumption is below
its reference level).
The household maximizes the following expected utility as given by (3) and (5)
Max(C1,α) : E(U(C1, α)) = V (C1 − C¯1) + δ EV (C2 − C¯2)
such that : C1 ≥ CL, C2g ≥ C2b ≥ (1 + rf )CL, α ≥ 0 and
C¯2 = (1 + rf )
[
wC1 + (1− w)C¯1
]
where CL and (1+rf )CL determine the minimum first and second period consumption levels,
8
(relative) gains(relative) losses
consumption reference level
Figure 1: Prospect theory (S-shaped) value function
so that the household does not starve (CL ≥ 0). Based on this and (2) the household’s
maximization problem can be formulated as follows
Max(C1,α) : E(U(C1, α)) = V (C1 − C¯1)
+ δ EV
(
(1 + rf )(Y1 − (1− w)C¯1) + Y2 − (1 + rf )(1 + w)C1 + (r − rf )α
)
such that : CL ≤ C1 ≤ Y1 +
Y2
1+rf
− CL −
rf−rb
1+rf
α
0 ≤ α ≤
(1+rf )(Y1−2CL)+Y2
rf−rb
(6)
Note that the upper bound on C1 follows from C2b ≥ (1 + rf )CL and the upper bound on α
follows from the imposition of the upper bound on C1, which is at the same time larger than
or equal to CL, i.e., Y1 +
Y2
1+rf
−CL −
rf−rb
1+rf
α ≥ CL. Finally, the last inequality on α implies
that
CL ≤
1
2
(
Y1 +
Y2
1 + rf
)
(7)
which we will assume to hold. In addition we assume4 that CL ≤ C¯1 and thus that
CL ≤ min
{
1
2
(
Y1 +
Y2
1 + rf
)
, C¯1
}
(8)
4This is required for the feasibility of certain solutions.
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2.2 Methodology
Prior to presenting the main results of the study we sketch the approach we chose to conduct
the formal analysis, which requires the consideration of eight household consumption decision
problems:
(P1) C¯1 ≤ C1, C¯2 ≤ C2b ≤ C2g
(P2) C¯1 ≤ C1, (1 + rf )CL ≤ C2b ≤ C¯2 ≤ C2g
(P3) C¯1 ≤ C1, (1 + rf )CL ≤ C2g ≤ C¯2 ≤ C2b
(P4) C¯1 ≤ C1, (1 + rf )CL ≤ C2b ≤ C2g ≤ C¯2
(P5) CL ≤ C1 ≤ C¯1, C¯2 ≤ C2b ≤ C2g
(P6) CL ≤ C1 ≤ C¯1, (1 + rf )CL ≤ C2b ≤ C¯2 ≤ C2g
(P7) CL ≤ C1 ≤ C¯1, (1 + rf )CL ≤ C2g ≤ C¯2 ≤ C2b
(P8) CL ≤ C1 ≤ C¯1, (1 + rf )CL ≤ C2b ≤ C2g ≤ C¯2
The first four problems (P1)–(P4) assume that the household keeps current period con-
sumption equal to or above the reference level experiencing a relative gain in the first period.
In (P1) the household does not suffer from relative losses neither in the second period. In
problems (P2)–(P4), however, there are relative losses: in (P2) the relative losses occur in
the bad state of nature while in (P4) the relative losses are observed in both states of nature.
Note that as C2g ≥ C2b any feasible solution for (P3) or (P7) satisfies C2g = C2b = C¯2, which
implies that any solution feasible for (P3) is feasible also for (P1), (P2) and (P4), and any
solution feasible for (P7) is feasible also for (P5), (P6) and (P8). Thus, problems (P3) and
(P7) can be dropped from our analysis.
In the remaining problems (P5), (P6) and (P8) current consumption is below, or equal
to, its reference level and thus the household experiences relative losses in the first period.
In problem (P5) the household keeps future consumption above its reference level and suffers
relative losses only in the first period. In (P6) there are losses if the bad state of nature occurs.
In the last problem (P8) there are relative losses in both periods. In what follows we show
that (P1), no losses, (P2), losses in the second period in the bad state of nature, and (P5),
losses only in the first period, have optimal interior solutions, and for certain conditions based
on the degree of loss aversion, the size of the current reference consumption level C¯1, and/or
the size of the discount factor one of these solutions is the solution of our main problem (6).
For higher first period consumption reference levels some of the problems have solutions at
the border of the set of feasible solutions. These are problems (P4), (P6) and (P8), and their
optimal solutions will not be explored in this paper.5
5Appendix B provides the optimal solution to all problems for a more general second period reference level
C¯2 = w0 + w1C1 + w2C¯1, where 0 ≤ w0 ≤ (1 + rf )Y1 + Y2, w1, w2 ≥ 0, C1 ≥ C1L ≥ 0 and C2b ≥ C2L ≥ 0.
To reduce the complexity in the main text we use a simpler formulation for the determination of the second
period reference level, namely: w0 = 0, w1 = (1 + rf )w, w2 = (1 + rf )(1 − w), w ∈ [0, 1], C1L = CL ≥ 0
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We assume that a sufficiently loss averse household makes two sequential decisions. The
household first decides whether it is the less ambitious type driven by the self-enhancement
motive, whether it is balanced or whether it is more ambitious governed by the self-improvement
motive, and only after figuring out its level of ambition the household makes its choices for
current consumption and risk taking. We treat these motives as exogenous due to the house-
hold’s psychological state of mind or due to its own income or the income of the Joneses to
which it compares. The less ambitious household chooses its first period consumption ref-
erence level to be below some threshold level, the balanced household chooses its reference
level to be equal to the threshold, and the more ambitious household chooses its first period
reference consumption to be larger than the threshold. This threshold (separating less am-
bitious from more ambitious households) is equal to the average (half) of the present value
of total income, i.e., 12
(
Y1 +
Y2
1+rf
)
. Note that the balanced household with such a neutral
first period reference level will consume exactly its reference consumption in both the first
and the second period.6 Depending on the level of ambition (and other characteristics), the
sufficiently loss averse household will achieve relative gains in both periods, (P1), or current
relative gains, relative gains in the good state of nature in second period but relative losses in
the bad state of nature in the second period, (P2), or current relative losses and relative gains
in the second period, (P5). Note finally that if the scarcity constraint exceeds the current
consumption reference level (i.e., CL > C¯1) then the household can achieve relative gains only
in the first period7 and thus the optimal solution is achieved only in either (P1) or (P2).
3 Main results
In Section 3.1, we show the optimal consumption and risky asset holdings to problem (6)
for a less ambitious household. The household’s solution is provided by problem (P1). The
solution related to current consumption and risk taking exists for a sufficiently loss averse
household with a relatively low reference level C¯1, namely below the threshold level, and
is such that consumption exceeds the corresponding reference consumption in both periods
across both states of nature. By being less ambitious the household selects consumption and
risk taking in such a way as to avoid relative losses today and in the future. In addition,
the household needs to be sufficiently loss averse for an optimal solution to exist in (P1),
even though the loss aversion parameter does not explicitly appear in the optimal solution
for current consumption and risk taking. Proposition 1 shows the closed-form solution to
consumption and risk taking.
and C2L = (1 + rf )CL. Note that the model in Hlouskova, Fortin and Tsigaris (2017), which dealt with
an exogenous second period consumption reference level, is imbedded in this general model, namely, when
w1 = w2 = 0 and thus C¯2 = w0, and CL = 0.
6In this case the second period reference level will be equal to the accumulated first period reference level,
i.e., C¯2 = (1 + rf )C¯1 =
1
2
[(1 + rf )Y1 + Y2].
7To avoid this we assume that CL ≤ C¯1, see (8).
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In Section 3.2, we describe the optimal consumption and risk taking for a balanced house-
hold. This is a very special situation, where the household’s first period reference level is
equal to the average present value of its total wealth (neutral reference level) and hence con-
sumption is exactly equal to its reference consumption in both periods. This can also be
viewed as a comparison to a reference household with the same total wealth (comparison to
someone like me).8
In Section 3.3 we show the optimal consumption and risky asset holdings to problem (6)
for a more ambitious household. The solution is provided by problem (P2) or (P5). The
optimal solution exists for a sufficiently loss averse household with a relatively high current
reference level, namely above the threshold level, and is such that the optimal consumption
is below its corresponding reference consumption in either the first or the second period.
Proposition 2 shows the closed-form solution of (6) for a more ambitious household with a
high time preference (or a sufficiently large probability of the good state of nature to occur),
where the solution is the solution of problem (P2), while Proposition 3 presents the closed-
form solution of (6) for a more ambitious household with a low time preference, where the
solution is the solution of problem (P5). In the first case the household will achieve relative
gains today and in the future in the good state of nature but will incur relative losses in the
future in the bad state, while in the second case the household has to accept current relative
losses but will achieve relative gains in both states in the future.
As we will show, the different types of households have very distinct solutions for current
consumption and risk taking activity. Also their responses, as well as the responses of the
indirect utility function (happiness), to exogenous changes in the loss aversion parameter, the
first period reference level, the habit persistence and finally the income/wealth levels vary
substantially.
In Sections 3.4 and 3.5 we summarize the income effects and other effects across the
different types of household and investigate the impact of income taxation.
3.1 Low first period reference consumption: less ambitious households
In this section we consider a household with a relatively low first period reference consumption.
This reference consumption is below a certain threshold9 and is such that the household can
consume above its reference levels in both the first and the second period, and may thus
avoid any relative losses. We call a household with such a first period reference level less
ambitious. This household’s behavior is captured by problem (P1). Before proceeding further,
8See Clark et al. (2008).
9Namely below the average present value of total wealth, see (11).
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we introduce the following notation
Ω = (1 + rf )Y1 + Y2 − 2 (1 + rf ) C¯1 (9)
Kγ =
(1− p)(rf − rb)
1−γ
p (rg − rf )1−γ
(10)
C¯U,P11 =
1
2
(
Y1 +
Y2
1 + rf
)
(11)
λP1−P2 =
[(
rf−rb
(1+rf )(rg−rb+w(rf−rb))
)1−γ
+ δp
] [
Ω+ (rg − rf )α
C1=C¯1
C2b=C2L
]1−γ
δ(1 − p)
[
(1 + rf )(C¯1 − CL)
]1−γ
−
Ω1−γ [(1 + rf )(1 + w) +M ]
γ
δ(1 − p)(1 + rf )(1 + w)
[
(1 + rf )(C¯1 − CL)
]1−γ for C¯1 ≤ C¯P11 (12)
λP1−P5 =


k2
(
1 +K
1
γ
γ
)
(1 + rf )(1 +w)


γ
=
[
M
(1 + rf )(1 + w)
]γ
(13)
k2 =
[
δ(1 + rf )(1 + w) p
(
rg − rb
rf − rb
)1−γ] 1γ
(14)
M =
[
δ(1 + rf )(1 + w) p
rg − rb
rf − rb
] 1
γ rf − rb +K
1
γ
0 (rg − rf )
rg − rb
(15)
αC1=C¯1C2b=C2L =
(1 + rf )(Y1 − C¯1 − CL) + Y2
rf − rb
(16)
Note that C¯1 < C¯
U,P1
1 is equivalent to Ω > 0.
10 We present the optimal solution for first period
consumption and risk taking of the less ambitious household in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Let C¯1 < C¯
U,P1
1 and λ > max
{
λP1−P2, λP1−P5
}
. Then problem (6) obtains
10Note that HFT characterize the different types of household through Ω (being positive, equal to zero, or
negative), while in this study we define the different types of household through their first period consumption
reference levels (being smaller than, equal to, or larger than a threshold value), which we think makes more
sense. However, we could equivalently describe our households through Ω.
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a unique maximum at (C∗1 , α
∗) =
(
CP11 , α
P1
)
, where
CP11 = C¯1 +
Ω
(1 + rf )(1 +w) +M
=
(1 + rf )Y1 + Y2 + [M − (1 + rf )(1 − w)]C¯1
(1 + rf )(1 + w) +M
> C¯1 (17)
αP1 =
(
1−K
1
γ
0
)
M
rf − rb +K
1
γ
0 (rg − rf )
(
CP11 − C¯1
)
> 0 (18)
Proof. See Appendix B.
The future relative gains, or excess consumption, are given by:
CP12g − C¯2 = k2
rg−rb
rf−rb
(
CP11 − C¯1
)
> 0
CP12b − C¯2 = k2K
1
γ
0
rg−rb
rf−rb
(
CP11 − C¯1
)
> 0

 (19)
Current relative gains, CP11 − C¯1, are driving both the investment in the financial market as
well as future excess consumption, see (18) and (19). The higher the relative gains in the first
period the higher the investment in the financial market and the higher the relative gains
(excess consumption) in the future. Note that the household invests positively in the risky
asset. Total savings, however, which include both risky and risk-free assets, may be either
positive or negative. The household’s consumption and risk taking does not directly depend
on the degree of loss aversion; however, the household needs to be sufficiently loss averse.11
Thus the optimal consumption in both periods as well as the relative consumption in both
periods, risk taking and happiness are insensitive to changes in the degree of loss aversion.
The effect of an increase in the first period consumption reference level on current and
future consumption cannot be determined a priori, see
dCP11
dC¯1
=
M
1+rf
− 1 + w
M
1+rf
+ 1 + w


> 0, if δ > δ¯
= 0, if δ = δ¯
< 0, if δ < δ¯
(20)
where
δ¯ =
(
1− w
1 +K
1/γ
γ
)γ (
rf − rb
rg − rb
)1−γ 1
p (1 + w)(1 + rf )1−γ
(21)
11As shown in Proposition 1, the loss aversion parameter needs to be sufficiently large, namely λ >
max
{
λP1−P2, λP1−P5
}
, to guarantee that the utility of (P1) at its maximum exceeds the potential maxi-
mum of (P2) at its border, λ > λP1−P2, as well as the potential maximum of (P5) at its border, λ > λP1−P5.
Note that problem (P1) is a concave programming problem and its unique maximum does not depend on λ.
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It depends on the household’s time preference, i.e., on its discount factor, as follows: a rela-
tively high discount factor (large weight placed to the future) will cause current consumption
to increase with increasing C¯1, while a relatively low discount factor (small weight place to
the future) will cause current consumption to decrease.12 However, the effect on optimal
consumption in the second period is opposite: future consumption increases with a lower dis-
count factor and shrinks with a higher discount factor. In addition, the sensitivity of second
period consumption in the bad state to the first period reference consumption depends on
the probability of the good state. Relative current and future consumption decreases with
an increasing first period reference level and also risk taking decreases when the current con-
sumption reference level increases. The latter happens because the increase in the current
consumption reference level decreases the relative gains in the first period discouraging in-
vestment in the risky asset. Finally, an increase in the first period reference level will reduce
the household’s happiness and thus the highest possible level of happiness is achieved for
the lowest possible current consumption reference level. This suggests that comparison does
not make oneself happy, and indeed not comparing at all would be the best. Note that the
sensitivity results with respect to the first period reference level are similar (in terms of sign)
to the ones when the second period consumption reference level is exogenous (see Hlouskova,
Fortin and Tsigaris, 2017), except for the sensitivity of first and second period consumption: if
the second period reference level is exogenous then first period consumption always increases,
and second period consumption in both states of nature always decreases, with a rising first
period reference level.
As stated earlier habit persistence in consumption is determined by the parameter w.
An increase in w reduces optimal first period consumption (and thus also the first period
relative consumption) and the level of happiness, while it increases the investment in the
risky asset. The effect of an increase in w on the second period reference level, however, is not
unambiguous. It depends on the curvature, γ, the discount factor, δ, and on the level of habit
persistence in consumption, w, itself. If the household is rather risk averse (γ > 0.5), however,
then the effect of habit persistence on the second period reference level is always positive.
Also the effect of w on the second period consumption in the bad state can be either positive
or negative. Namely the second period consumption in the bad state increases with increasing
habit persistence in the first period consumption when w is below a certain threshold and it
decreases with increasing habit persistence in the first period consumption when w exceeds
the threshold.13 On the other hand, the impact of w on the second period consumption in
the good state is always positive. Note that as habit persistence in consumption, w, relates
negatively to habit persistence in the current consumption reference level, 1−w, the reported
dependencies hold with the opposite sign for habit persistence in the first period reference
12Note, however, that a larger persistence in consumption reduces the threshold of the discount factor, see
(21), which makes it more plausible that first period reference consumption encourages current consumption.
13This threshold is a function of the parameters describing the financial market and on the curvature.
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level.
Current consumption depends positively on income, i.e., it depends positively on both
first period and second period income.14 An increase in the first period income, as in good
economic times, will increase current consumption by (1 + rf )/[(1 + rf )(1 +w) +M)], while
an increase in the second period income (i.e., good future economic conditions) will increase
current consumption by 1/[(1+rf )(1+w)+M)]. Note that the presence of habit persistence in
consumption has reduced the impact of income upon current consumption relative to models
without such a behavioral trait. Furthermore, an increase in income will increase second
period consumption as well as the relative gains (excess consumption) in both periods, the
second period reference level, the investment in the risky asset and the level of happiness.
Note that a sudden reduction in income, caused by a recession or a loss of job (bad economic
conditions) or by the introduction of an income tax, will cause the opposite effect and the
household will thus reduce current consumption and risk taking. Note in addition that if the
first period reference level is equal to a fraction of the present value of the total wealth, i.e.,
C¯1 = c
(
Y1 +
Y2
1+rf
)
where c ∈
(
0, 12
)
,15 then the sensitivity results will not change. This
suggests that the direct income effect is stronger than the indirect effect of income through
the first period consumption reference level. Table 1 summarizes the sensitivity results related
to Proposition 1, which have been discussed above.
Finally, it can be shown that the expected utility evaluated at the optimal choices is
determined by the relative gains in the first period:
(1− γ)E
(
U
(
CP11 , α
P1
))
=
[(1 + rf )(1 + w) +M ]
γ
(1 + rf )(1 + w)
(
CP11 − C¯1
)1−γ
(22)
The household will be more happy with a rising income, while it will be less happy with a
larger first period reference level (as the first period relative consumption decreases) and a
higher persistence in current consumption, see Table 1.
C∗1 = C
P1
1 and α
∗ = αP1
dC∗1 dC
∗
2g dC
∗
2b dα
∗ dC¯2 d(C
∗
1 − C¯1) d(C
∗
2g − C¯2) d(C
∗
2b − C¯2) d(E(U(C
∗
1 , α
∗)))
dλ = 0 = 0 = 0 = 0 = 0 = 0 = 0 = 0 = 0
dC¯1 ≷ 0 ≶ 0 ≶ 0 < 0 > 0 < 0 < 0 < 0 < 0
dw < 0 > 0 ≶ 0 > 0 ≶ 0 < 0 > 0 > 0 < 0
dYi > 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 > 0
Table 1: Sensitivity results for the less ambitious household with respect to λ, C¯1, w and Yi,
i = 1, 2.
14We say that some quantity depends positively (negatively) on income, if it depends positively (negatively)
on both first period income and second period income.
15The fraction needs to be less than one half such that the household is less ambitious.
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3.2 Neutral first period reference consumption: balanced households
This special case applies when the household is neither less ambitious (see the previous sec-
tion) nor more ambitious (see the following section). The household is balanced in the sense
that it consumes exactly its reference levels, in both the first and the second period. This
requires that the household’s first period reference level is equal to the threshold separating
less ambitious from more ambitious households. The reference consumption is thus equal
to the average of the discounted income, i.e., C¯1 = C¯
U,P1
1 =
1
2
(
Y1 +
Y2
1+rf
)
. We call this
reference level the neutral first period reference consumption. Note that the neutral reference
level depends explicitly on the household’s exogenous income. Note, in addition, that if the
household’s total income coincides with the total income of some reference household then
this current reference consumption can be viewed as an external reference consumption, as
the household compares itself to someone like itself.
The following corollary describes the solution of the balanced household.
Corollary 1 Let C¯1 = C¯
U,P1
1 and λ > max
{
λP1−P2, λP1−P5
}
. Then problem (6) obtains its
unique maximum at (C∗1 , α
∗), where
C∗1 =
1
2
(
Y1 +
Y2
1 + rf
)
= C¯U,P11
α∗ = 0
Proof. See Appendix B.
The sufficiently loss averse balanced household will consume exactly its consumption ref-
erence level in the first period, which is equal to half the current value of total income. In
addition, it will not invest in the financial market even though the expected return from
the risky asset is greater than the return from the safe asset. This phenomenon can help to
explain the equity premium puzzle as it indicates that the risk premium is not sufficient to
induce the household to invest in the risky asset. The savings will thus consist only of the
risk-free investment, which can be positive, zero or negative, based on how the first period
income and the discounted second period income relate to each other:
S = m =
1
2
(
Y1 −
Y2
1 + rf
)

> 0 if Y1 >
Y2
1+rf
= 0 if Y1 =
Y2
1+rf
< 0 if Y1 <
Y2
1+rf
(23)
Note, in addition, that also in the second period in both states of nature the household
consumes exactly its consumption reference level, i.e., C¯2 = C2g = C2b =
1
2 [(1+ rf )Y1+Y2] =
(1 + rf )C¯
U,P1
1 = (1 + rf )C¯1, which implies that this solution is feasible for all sub-problems
(P1)–(P8) and thus can be considered a threshold solution, where the household achieves no
relative gains and no relative losses in either period.
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If the household’s income increases either in the first period and/or in the second period,
while other parameters remain unchanged, including C¯1, then the household’s upper bound
C¯U,P11 will also increase and as a result the household will become relatively less ambitious
since now C¯1 < C¯
U,P1
1 . Thus, the household will be able to avoid relative losses in both periods.
If on the other hand, the household’s income falls unexpectedly, while other parameters remain
unchanged, then this will reduce the household’s threshold level C¯U,P11 and thus the first
period reference level will be above this new upper bound C¯U,P11 . As a result the household
will become more ambitious in order to make up for the lost income. In this case its optimal
consumption will be below the reference level either in the second period in the bad state of
nature, problem (P2), or in the first period, problem (P5). We will discuss these cases in the
next section.
Suppose the household has initially a current consumption reference level below the thresh-
old level and hence is less ambitious. Then it is hit by a sudden reduction in income, e.g.,
due to a loss of job in bad economic times, which triggers a decrease of the threshold level
such that the household’s (constant) reference level is above the new threshold, and hence the
household is more ambitious. This switch from the less ambitious (across the balanced) to
the more ambitious type will change, for example, its sensitivity of risk taking with respect to
income: while before the drop in income the household (which is less ambitious) takes on less
risk with decreasing income, it will be eager to take on more risk with a decreasing income
– with the hope to make up for the lost income – after the drop in income (when it will be
more ambitious).16
Note that consumption in both periods (as well as the relative consumption in both
periods), risk taking and happiness are unaffected by changes in the level of loss aversion, as
well as by changes in the persistence level in current consumption.
3.3 High first period reference consumption: more ambitious households
If the first period reference level exceeds the threshold level which is equal to the average
of the discounted income, i.e., if C¯1 > C¯
U,P1
1 =
1
2
(
Y1 +
Y2
1+rf
)
, then the household cannot
consume above its reference levels in both periods. In either the first or the second period the
household will have to consume below its reference consumption, and thus will incur relative
losses. A household with such a high first period reference level is called more ambitious. The
optimal consumption of the more ambitious household will be either below its consumption
reference level in the second period in the bad state of nature, problem (P2), or in the first
period, problem (P5). Which case occurs, problem (P2) or (P5), depends on the household’s
time preference, i.e., on its discount factor, and on the probability of the good state to occur.
If the sufficiently loss averse household is relatively time impatient and assigns a low weight
to future consumption (i.e., it has a small discount factor, or a high time preference) then the
16See the sensitivity results in Tables 1 and 2.
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optimal solution of (6) for optimal consumption and risk taking coincides with the optimal
solution of problem (P2). In this problem the optimal consumption in the first period is above
its reference level, as in problem (P1). However, in the second period the household cannot
avoid relative losses in the bad state of nature. Proposition 2 provides the optimal solution
for this case. This case also applies if the probability of the good state of nature is sufficiently
large (irrespective of the household’s time preference). On the other hand, if the discount
factor is relatively large (i.e, future consumption is valued high), and the probability of the
good state is not too high, then the sufficiently loss averse household will find a solution where
first period consumption is below the first period reference level (suffering relative losses in
the first period) but will keep future consumption above the endogenous reference level in
both states of nature. The solution for this case is presented in Proposition 3. The first
period reference level cannot be arbitrarily large, however. It needs to be smaller than a
certain threshold, C¯U,P21 .
To summarize, if the more ambitious household values first period consumption relatively
high (lower discount factor), then it focuses on avoiding relative losses in the first period and
thus first period consumption is above its reference level. If, however, the more ambitious
household values second period consumption relatively high (larger discount factor), then it
wants to prevent relative losses in the second period and consequently second period con-
sumption exceeds its reference level. This is only true, however, if the probability of the
good state is not too large. If it is larger than a certain threshold then only the first case
applies, where relative losses occur in the second period in the bad state, irrespective of the
household’s time preference.17
17Note that for better readability we will often omit the information on the large (small) enough probability
of the good state of nature in identifying the type of household, and simply call a household that finds it
optimal solution in problem (P2) “more ambitious with a high time preference”, and a household that finds
its optimal solution in problem (P5) “more ambitious with a low time preference”.
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Before proceeding further, we introduce the following notation
C¯U,P21 =
rg−rb
rg−rf
(
Y1 +
Y2
1+rf
)
− CL
1 + 2
rf−rb
rg−rf
(24)
C¯U,P51 =
Y1 +
Y2
1+rf
− (1 + w)CL
1− w
(25)
k =
[
δ(1 + rf )(1 + w)(1 − p)
(
rg − rb
rg − rf
)1−γ] 1γ
(26)
M(λ) =
[
δ(1 + rf )(1 + w) p
(
rg − rb
rf − rb
)1−γ] 1γ [
(λKγ)
1/γ − 1
]
(27)
CUL =
rg − rb
rg − rf
(
Y1 +
Y2
1 + rf
)
−
(
1 + 2
rf − rb
rg − rf
C¯1
)
(28)
λP2 =
[
(1 + rf )(1 + w)
k
+
(
1
Kγ
)1/γ]γ 1 +
rf−rb
rg−rf
+
1+rf+k2
(1+rf )(1+w)+k2
CU2L − (1 + rf )CL
(−Ω)


γ
(29)
for CL <
CU2L
1 + rf
and C¯U,P11 < C¯1 < C¯
U,P2
1
λP2−P2 =
[(
rf−rb
(1+rf )(rg−rb+w(rf−rb))
)1−γ
+ δp
] [
Ω+ (rg − rf )α
C1=C¯1
C2b=C2L
]1−γ
δ(1 − p)
[(
(1 + rf )(C¯1 − CL)
)1−γ
−
(
rg−rb
rg−rf
)1−γ
(−Ω)1−γ
] (30)
λP4 =
1
(1 + rf )1−γw δ

w
(
Y1 +
Y2
1+rf
)
+ (1− w)C¯1 − (1 + w)CL
αC1=C¯1C2b=C2L − α
C2g=C¯2
C2b=C2L
1 + rf
rf − rb


γ
(31)
for C¯1 < C¯
U,P2
1
λP5 = λP1−P5

 (1 + w)(C¯1 − CL)
(1− w)
(
C¯U,P51 − C¯1
)


γ
(32)
λP2−P6 =
δp(1 + rf )
2
(
rg−rb
rf−rb
+ w
)2
(C¯1 − CL)
1+γ
[1 + δ(1 − p)(1 + rf )1−γw2]
[
Ω+ (rg − rf )α
C1=C¯1
C2b=C2L
]1+γ (33)
δP2−P5 =
1
1− p
[
rg − rf
(1 + rf )(1 + w)(rg − rb)
]1−γ
(34)
α
C2g=C¯2
C2b=C2L
=
(1 + rf )(C¯1 − CL) + w
[
(1 + rf )(Y1 − C¯1 − CL) + Y2
]
rg − rb +w (rf − rb)
(35)
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The optimal solution for first period consumption and risk taking is given in the next
proposition.
Proposition 2 Let C¯P11 < C¯1 < C¯
U,P2
1 , λ > max
{
λP2, λP2−P2, λP4, λP5, λP2−P6
}
,
δ ≤ δP2−P5 and CL < C
U
L . Then problem (6) obtains a unique maximum at (C
∗
1 , α
∗) =(
CP21 , α
P2
)
, where
CP21 = C¯1 −
Ω
M(λ)− (1 + rf )(1 + w)
> C¯1 (36)
αP2 =
[(
1
K0
)1/γ
+ λ1/γ
]
k
rg − rf
(
CP21 − C¯1
)
> 0 (37)
Proof. See Appendix B.
Note that for a sufficiently large probability of the good state18 the threshold value of
the discount factor is larger than one (δP2−P5 > 1) and is thus not binding. In that case
Proposition 2 applies, irrespective of the household’s time preference. The reason is that the
household is rather willing to accept a relative loss in the bad state of nature, which occurs
with a small enough probability, than to face a relative loss in the first period, which occurs
with certainty.
Future relative gains (in the good state of nature) and losses (in the bad state of nature)
are given by
CP22g − C¯2 = k
rg−rb
rg−rf
(
1
K0
) 1
γ (
CP21 − C¯1
)
> 0
C¯2 − C
P2
2b = k
rg−rb
rg−rf
λ
1
γ
(
CP21 − C¯1
)
> 0

 (38)
In problem (P1) the loss aversion parameter does not affect the optimal choices but here loss
aversion plays a significant role. An increase in the degree of loss aversion will result in a
decline in the first period consumption, a decline in the future consumption in the good state
of nature, and a decline in the endogenous second period consumption reference level, but will
increase future consumption in the bad state of nature. An increase in loss aversion will also
reduce relative gains in the good state of nature in the second period because of the decline in
relative gains in the first period. In addition, an increase in loss aversion will reduce relative
losses in the bad state of nature in the second period. Even though there are two opposite
effects on relative losses in the second period arising from an increase in loss aversion it can
be shown that the indirect effect from the decline in CP21 − C¯1 overpowers the direct impact
from increasing the loss aversion parameter. Finally, an increase in loss aversion will reduce
the exposure to the stock market and reduce the happiness level.
18Namely for 1 > p > 1 −
[
rg−rf
(1+rf )(1+w)(rg−rb)
]1−γ
. Note that p must also be larger than
rf−rb
rg−rb
, which is
implied by the assumption E(r) > rf .
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Contrary to problem (P1), an increase in the first period reference level will increase first
period consumption, see (36), which is in line with the assumption on preferring the presence
to the future. Also it will increase second period consumption in the good state of nature, the
second period reference level, and the investment in the financial market because the increase
in C¯1 increases relative gains C
P2
1 − C¯1. However, an increase in C¯1 will reduce future
consumption in the bad state of nature. Relative gains of consumption in the first period
will increase, and so will future relative gains in the good state of nature by having higher
future relative losses in the bad state of nature. Similarly as in problem (P1), an increase in
the first period reference level will decrease the level of happiness, i.e., not comparing at all
makes one the happiest. Note that the sensitivities of the solutions (in terms of signs) with
respect to loss aversion and the first period consumption reference level are the same as in
the case of an exogenous second period reference level, as reported in Hlouskova, Fortin and
Tsigaris (2017).
An increase in the habit persistence in consumption reduces the current consumption,
the relative consumption in both periods, risk taking, as well as the happiness level. Finally,
the increase in the habit persistence in current consumption reduces also the second period
endogenous reference level, C¯2, and future consumption in the good state of nature, C
P2
2g ,
for a sufficiently large habit persistence level (where the threshold depends on the curvature
parameter which is binding only for γ ≤ 0.5), while it increases both C¯2 and C
P2
2g when
the household is sufficiently loss averse and at the same time exhibits a lower level of habit
persistence in consumption. Note that the opposite dynamics hold when we consider the effect
of the habit persistence in the consumption reference level. Finally, note that the dynamics of
the current consumption, current relative consumption, second period endogenous reference
level and the happiness level with respect to the habit persistence are in line with the dynamics
of the less ambitious households.
A change in income here has profoundly different effects from those related to the less
ambitious household. An unexpected decrease in income, due to, e.g., a loss of job in bad
economic times, will increase first period consumption, second period consumption in the
good state of nature, investment in the financial market and also the endogenous second
period consumption reference level. In addition, a decrease of income increases the relative
consumption in both periods. On the other hand, the second period consumption in the bad
state of nature will decrease when income decreases, and so will the happiness level. These
effects are opposite (in terms of sign) with respect to those reported for the less ambitious
household, with the exception of the future consumption in the bad state of nature and the
happiness level, which both decrease with a falling income. The reason is probably related to
the fact that the more ambitious household cannot consume above its consumption reference
levels at all times while the less ambitious household can always do that. Total savings actually
decrease with a falling income. Note finally that if the first period reference consumption
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level is equal to a fraction of the present value of total wealth, i.e., C¯1 = c
(
Y1 +
Y2
1+rf
)
where
c > 12 ,
19 then the vast majority of sensitivity results become opposite in sign, including the
happiness level. This suggests that the indirect effect of income through the first period
consumption reference level is stronger than the direct income effect. Thus, in this case the
happiness decreases with an increasing income, which is not entirely inconsistent with the
literature which finds that as income moves beyond the levels associated with happiness,
overall life satisfaction actually decreases, see Jebb et al. (2018).20 All the sensitivities with
respect to problem (P2), which we discussed above, are presented in Table 2.
Note, that the value of the expected utility at the optimum (the level of happiness) is
determined by the relative gains in the first period, like in problem (P1):
(1− γ)E
(
U
(
CP21 , α
P2
))
= −
[
k
(1 + rf )(1 + w)
(
λ
1
γ −
(
1
Kγ
) 1
γ
)
− 1
] (
CP21 − C¯1
)1−γ
(39)
The more ambitious household will be happier with a larger income, while it will be less happy
with an increasing first period reference level (even though first period relative gains increase,
but also relative losses in the second period in the bad state rise) and a higher persistence in
current consumption. These effects are the same as those for the less ambitious household.
In addition a larger degree of loss aversion affects the happiness negatively, see Table 2.
Before proceeding further let us introduce the following notation
λP5−P2 =

 k(1+rf )(1+w) 1K1/γγ + 1
k
(1+rf )(1+w)
− 1


γ
for δ > δP2−P5 (40)
The next proposition shows the case where the household is again more ambitious (i.e., it
cannot avoid relative losses at all times) but values future consumption higher (i.e., has a
larger discount factor) than the household described by Proposition 2. This is why it strives
to avoid relative losses in the second period but has to accept them in the first period. For
this to hold, the probability of the good state of nature must be small enough. If it is larger,21
then the household can avoid relative losses in the first period but has to accept them in the
second period in the bad state (which occurs with a small enough probability), i.e., it always
solves problem (P2), irrespective of its time preference.
Proposition 3 Let C¯U,P11 < C¯1 < C¯
U,P2
1 , λ > max
{
λP1−P5, λP2, λP2−P2, λP5, λP5−P2, λP2−P6
}
and δ > δP2−P5. Then problem (6) obtains a unique maximum at (C∗1 , α
∗) =
(
CP51 , α
P5
)
19The fraction needs to be larger than one half such that the household is more ambitious.
20Jebb et al. (2018) find that the ideal income point when money no longer increases an individual’s
happiness is $95,000 for overall satisfaction with life, and $60,000 to $75,000 for emotional well-being. They
use a collection of survey responses from over 1.7 million people spanning 164 countries.
21For the precise threshold see Footnote 18.
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where
CP51 = C¯1 −
λ1/γ
λ1/γ − (λP1−P5)1/γ
×
−Ω
(1 + rf )(1 + w)
=
λ1/γ
[
Y1 +
Y2
1+rf
− (1− w)C¯1
]
−
(
λP1−P5
)1/γ
(1 +w)C¯1[
λ1/γ − (λP1−P5)
1/γ
]
(1 + w)
< C¯1 (41)
αP5 =
1−K
1/γ
0
rf − rb +K
1/γ
0 (rg − rf )
×
(
λP1−P5
)1/γ
λ1/γ − (λP1−P5)1/γ
× (−Ω) > 0 (42)
Proof. See Appendix B.
Here, too, the degree of loss aversion enters the solution, as in Proposition 2. However,
loss aversion has a different impact on the consumption pattern. An increase in loss aversion
will increase the first period consumption (and thus reduce the relative consumption losses
in the first period) as well as the second period consumption reference level. On the other
hand an increase in loss aversion will reduce the second period consumption in the good state
of nature and also the relative reference consumption in both states of nature. Higher loss
aversion will also reduce investment in the financial market and the happiness level, like in
problem (P2). Finally, the second period consumption in the bad state of nature will be
reduced with higher loss aversion if the habit persistence in consumption is sufficiently low,
it will be enhanced if the habit persistence in consumption is sufficiently large, and it will
remain the same if the habit persistence in consumption equals some threshold depending on
the parameters describing the financial market.22 Note that in the case with an exogenous
second period consumption reference level CP52b is decreasing with an increasing λ, while the
other effects remain the same (in terms of sign), see Hlouskova, Fortin and Tsigaris (2017).
The effect of the first period reference level on the first period consumption is negative,
while it is positive for the second period consumption in the good state, and mixed23 for the
second period consumption in the bad state. Also the effect of the first period reference level
on the second period endogenous reference level is not unambiguous. For sufficiently loss
averse households the effect of an increasing first period reference level is positive, while for
households with a smaller loss aversion it is negative. Moreover, an increasing first period
reference level enhances current relative losses and future relative gains in both states of
nature. Also risk taking increases with a higher first period reference level. Finally, the
happiness level shrinks when the first period consumption reference increases. Note that the
sensitivities with respect to the first period reference level coincide (in terms of signs) with
those related to an exogenous second period reference level, see Hlouskova, Fortin and Tsigaris
22This threshold value is equal to
rg−rb
rf−rb
K
1/γ
0
1−K
1/γ
0
, and it is smaller than one, i.e., binding, only for a sufficiently
large probability of the good state of nature, p.
23The effect is positive if the household is sufficiently loss averse.
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(2017).
The effect of habit persistence in consumption, w, on the second period reference level
is negative, while its effect on the investment in the risky asset, relative gains in the second
period as well as on the happiness level is positive. The effects on consumption in the first and
second periods and on relative losses in the first period cannot be determined unambiguously.
For sufficiently loss averse households, however, the effect of w on the first period consumption
is positive (and hence negative on current relative losses), while it is negative for the second
period consumption in both states of nature (and vice versa).
Regarding the sensitivity analysis with respect to income, an increase in income increases
first period consumption, the second period reference level and the happiness level, while
it decreases risk taking and relative consumption in both periods. The income effect on
consumption in the second period (in the good and in the bad states) cannot be determined
unambiguously, it can be either positive or negative. The effect is positive if the household
is sufficiently loss averse, while it is negative if the household is not that loss averse.24 These
income effects are partially different from those related to the less ambitious household: while
the effect on the first period consumption is the same (in terms of sign), the effect on risk
taking is opposite, and the effect on second period consumption can be either the same (if the
household is sufficiently loss averse) or opposite. The reason for the difference is that the more
ambitious household cannot consume above its reference levels at all times and incurs relative
losses in the first period. Consequently, an extra amount of income is rather used to increase
consumption in the first period, in order to decrease relative losses in the first period, than
to increase consumption in the second period when it is anyway above the reference level.
In addition, the less ambitious household increases its risk taking in the financial market
with increasing income, while the more ambitious household reduces its risk taking. Finally,
the main difference between the more ambitious household with a lower time preference,
(P5), and the more ambitious household with a higher time preference, (P2), is that the
household with a lower time preference increases its first period consumption and the second
period reference consumption when income increases while the household with a higher time
preference decreases its first period consumption and the second period reference consumption
with a growing income. Note finally that if the first period reference consumption level is equal
to a fraction of the present value of the total wealth, i.e., C¯1 = c
(
Y1 +
Y2
1+rf
)
where c > 12 ,
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then, as in the case with a more ambitious household with a higher time preference, the
majority of sensitivity results become opposite in sign. This suggests again that the indirect
effect of income through the first period consumption reference level is stronger than the
24Note again that an unexpected reduction in income can change the household’s degree of ambition. Let
the household be originally less ambitious. Then a drop of income (while keeping the first period reference
level constant) will also decrease the threshold C¯U,P11 , which may change the household to be more ambitious,
as the first period reference level might then exceed its threshold (C¯1 > C¯
U,P1
1 ) and the household will face
losses in the first period.
25The fraction needs to be larger than one half such that the household is more ambitious.
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direct income effect. Thus, in this case the happiness will again decrease with an increasing
income.
Table 2 summarizes the sensitivity results related to the solutions of problem (P5), which
we discussed above.
C∗1 = C
P2
1 and α
∗ = αP2
dC∗1 dC
∗
2g dC
∗
2b dα
∗ dC¯2 d(C
∗
1 − C¯1) d(C
∗
2g − C¯2) d(C¯2 − C
∗
2b) d(E(U(C
∗
1 , α
∗)))
dλ < 0 < 0 > 0 < 0 < 0 < 0 < 0 < 0 < 0
dC¯1 > 0 > 0 < 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 < 0
dw < 0 ≶ 0 > 0 < 0 ≶ 0 < 0 < 0 < 0 < 0
dYi < 0 < 0 > 0 < 0 < 0 < 0 < 0 < 0 > 0
C∗1 = C
P5
1 and α
∗ = αP5
dC∗1 dC
∗
2g dC
∗
2b dα
∗ dC¯2 d(C¯1 − C
∗
1) d(C
∗
2g − C¯2) d(C
∗
2b − C¯2) d(E(U(C
∗
1 , α
∗)))
dλ > 0 < 0 ≶ 0 < 0 > 0 < 0 < 0 < 0 < 0
dC¯1 < 0 > 0 ≷ 0 > 0 ≷ 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 < 0
dw ≷ 0 ≶ 0 ≶ 0 > 0 < 0 ≶ 0 > 0 > 0 > 0
dYi > 0 ≷ 0 ≷ 0 < 0 > 0 < 0 < 0 < 0 > 0
Table 2: Sensitivity results for the more ambitious household with respect to λ, C¯1, w, Yi,
i = 1, 2.
Finally, the value of the expected utility at the optimum can be determined by the relative
losses in the first period:
(1− γ)E
(
U
(
CP51 , α
P5
))
= −
[
−Ω
(1 + rf )(1 + w)
]1−γ [
λ1/γ − (λP1−P5)1/γ
]γ
= −λ
[
1−
(
λP1−P5
λ
)1/γ]
(C¯1 − C
P5
1 )
1−γ (43)
The effect of income on happiness is positive, while loss aversion and the first period reference
level impact the level of happiness negatively, see Table 2. These results are the same (in terms
of signs) as those for problem (P2). The only difference (between the two more ambitious
households differing in the rate of time preference) is in the effect of the persistence of current
period consumption on the happiness level. It is positive for the more ambitious household
with a lower time preference, while it is negative for the more ambitious household with a
higher time preference. The positive effect of income on happiness and the negative effect of
the first period reference level are also the same as for the less ambitious household.
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Before proceeding further let us introduce the following notation:
λP2−P6
C¯1=C¯
U,P2
1
=
(1 + rf )p
1
δ −
1
δP2−P6
(
rg − rb
rf − rb
+ w
)1−γ
(44)
δ(λ)P2−P5
C¯1=C¯
U,P2
1
= δP2−P5
[
1−
(
λP1−P5
λ
)1/γ]γ
(45)
δP2−P6 =
[
rg−rb
rf−rb
Y1−C¯1−CL+
Y2
1+rf
C¯U,P21 −CL
− w
]γ
(1− p)w
(46)
The following corollary describes the results when the current consumption reference level
reaches its upper bound. Note that, similarly as in Corollary 1, the first period reference level
is a function of the household’s income, but also its minimum consumption in the first period
and the (risk-free and risky) financial returns are part of the solution.
Corollary 2 Let C¯1 = C¯
U,P2
1 , λ > max
{
λP2−P4, λP5, λP2−P6
C¯1=C¯
U,P2
1
}
and
δ < min
{
δ(λ)P2−P5
C¯1=C¯
U,P2
1
, δP2−P6
}
. Then problem (6) obtains a unique maximum at (C∗1 , α
∗),
where
C∗1 = C¯1 = C¯
U,P2
1
α∗ =
(1 + rf )
(
Y1 − C¯
U,P2
1 −CL
)
+ Y2
rf − rb
> 0
Proof. See Appendix B.
Note that in this case, C1 = C¯1 = C¯
U,P2
1 , C2g = C¯2 = (1+rf )C¯1
U,P2
and C2b = (1+rf )CL.
The solution implies that the household can only consume its minimum level in the second
period in the bad state, and it consumes exactly the reference level in the first period and
in the second period in the good state. This household, like the other ones but unlike the
balanced household, engages positively in the stock market. Any further increase in the
first period reference level, while keeping the other parameters constant (such as income, the
scarcity constraint and/or returns of the safe and risky assets)26, i.e., C¯1 > C¯
U,P2
1 , will result
in a state where the household faces relative losses either in the second period (under both
states of nature) while keeping gains in the first period, (P4), or where it faces relative losses
only in the first period while keeping sure gains in the second period (in both states of nature),
(P5).27
26Or any reduction in income while keeping the other parameters (such as the first period reference level,
the scarcity constraint and/or returns of the safe and risky assets) constant.
27The solutions actually depend on the following threshold levels for the current reference consumption,
namely on C¯U,P21 < C¯
U,P4
1 < C¯
U,P5
1 < C¯
U,P6
1 . For C¯
U,P2
1 < C¯1 ≤ C¯
U,P4
1 the household that values future
27
3.4 Income and other effects – a summary
In this section we summarize the income effects and other effects on happiness, (relative)
consumption and risk taking across less ambitious and more ambitious households.
Income effects
All other things equal, more income, as in good economic times, is good: for both less
ambitious and more ambitious sufficiently loss averse households with a constant first period
consumption reference level a higher income increases the household’s happiness. For the less
ambitious household, which always consumes above its reference levels, this works through
higher current relative gains, see (22). For the more ambitious household which places less
weight to the future and thus faces relative losses in the bad state of nature in the second
period, this works through smaller current relative gains, see (39),28 while for the more
ambitious household which places more weight to the future and thus faces relative losses
in the first period, this works through a reduction of the current relative losses, see (43).
Note that the relation “more income – more happiness” is not true for the more ambitious
household, when its first period reference level depends on income, e.g., when it coincides
with a fraction (that exceeds one half) of the present value of its wealth. In this case more
income will imply a larger first period consumption reference level and will actually lead
to less happiness, which is due to the indirect effect through the first period reference level
outweighing the direct effect of income.
In addition, the less ambitious household increases its investment in the risky asset with
good economic times as income increases, while the more ambitious household decreases its
exposure to risky financial markets in good economic times and increases its exposure in bad
economic times.29 See Tables 1 and 2 for the described sensitivity results with respect to the
first and second period income.
Note that the effects of an increase of income, as discussed above, are the same as the
effects of a decrease of the tax rate when we assume a taxation of income endowment. See
Section 3.5 for more details.
consumption more, faces relative losses only in the current period, (P5), while the household that values
current consumption more achieves relative gains only in the current period, (P4). For C¯U,P41 < C¯1 ≤ C¯
U,P5
1
the household faces relative losses only in the current period, (P5). For even higher reference consumption,
C¯
U,P5
1 < C¯1 ≤ C¯
U,P6
1 , the household achieves relative gains only in the good state in the second period, (P6),
and finally for the largest values of reference consumption, namely C¯1 > C¯
U,P6
1 , the household faces relative
losses in both periods, (P8).
28Note that these smaller relative gains in the first period go hand in hand with smaller relative losses in
the second period in the bad state.
29Technically speaking, we must consider the effects of larger first and second period income separately. As
they are always the same (in terms of signs), however, we simply talk about the effects of income.
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Note finally that an increase of current income increases savings for both less and more
ambitious households.30 The effect of second period income on savings is opposite to the effect
of second period income on current consumption for both types of households. Thus, savings
are discouraged for less ambitious households and for more ambitious households with a low
time preference (that achieve relative gains in the second period), while they are encouraged
for more ambitious households with a high time preference (that face relative losses in the
bad state of nature in the second period).
Effects of the first period consumption reference level
Ceteris paribus, a higher first period consumption reference level is bad: both the less ambi-
tious and the more ambitious households will be less happy with a larger first period reference
level, i.e., a higher comparison level decreases happiness. Thus, the household seems to be
happiest when it does not compare itself to anybody at all. For the less ambitious household
being less happy with a rising first period reference level works through lower relative gains
in both periods as the relative gains shrink with an increasing first period reference level.
However, for the more ambitious household, this works only through larger relative losses,
enhanced by the penalty on losses, as both relative gains and losses increase with an increasing
first period consumption reference level.
The reaction of the less ambitious household’s consumption to an increase in the first
period reference level is ambiguous: A household with a smaller weight placed to the future
will decrease its current consumption and increase its future consumption while the opposite
happens for a household with a larger weight placed to the future. In the case of a more
ambitious household with a higher time preference, the current consumption as well as the
second period consumption in the good state of nature increase with increasing C¯1 while
the second period consumption in the bad state shrinks. On the other hand, in the case
of a more ambitious household with a lower time preference, the increase of the first period
reference level will cause a reduction in the current consumption but an increase in the future
consumption.31 Thus, for instance, if C¯1 is equal to the consumption of a reference household
(the Joneses) then our household is following the Joneses32 when it is either less ambitious
with a low time preference or when it is more ambitious with a high time preference. Note
that in the case of an exogenous second period consumption reference level, see Hlouskova,
30Only more ambitious households with a low time preference need to be sufficiently loss averse. If the
degree of loss aversion of these households, (P5), is not too large then savings will decrease with an increasing
current income. This may happen for households with a small persistence to current consumption.
31This holds also for the second period consumption in the bad state of nature, when the household is
sufficiently loss averse.
32The household is following the Joneses when the increase, or decrease, of the first period consumption of
a reference household (the Joneses) impacts this household such that its current consumption will change in
the same way as the one of the Joneses, i.e., it will increase if the current consumption of the Joneses increases
and vice versa. Note that in this context the household’s first period reference consumption is equal to the
current consumption of the Joneses.
29
Fortin and Tsigaris (2017), the less ambitious household follows the Joneses irrespective of
its time preference.
A larger first period reference level also implies a larger second period reference level,
except for the more ambitious household with a low rate of time preference (high discount
factor), where the effect can be positive or negative. Finally, the effect of a rising first period
reference level upon the household’s investment in the risky asset is negative for the less
ambitious household, and positive for the more ambitious household. Thus, the risk taking
decreases for less ambitious households with an increasing current consumption reference level
while it increases for more ambitious households when the current reference level increases.
See Tables 1 and 2 for the sensitivity results with respect to the first period consumption
reference level.
Effects of loss aversion
All other things equal, the degree of loss aversion does not have any effects on the less
ambitious household’s happiness, nor on its consumption or its investment in the risky asset.33
On the other hand, the more ambitious household is less happy with an increasing level of
loss aversion, which is triggered solely by shrinking relative gains (whenever there are gains).
An increasing level of loss aversion shows opposite effects (in terms of signs) on the second
period reference level, for different time preferences. The effect is negative for a high time
preference, and it is positive for a low time preference. Technically speaking, this works
through the impact of loss aversion on first period consumption (which is negative for a
high time preference, and positive for a low time preference). Finally, a higher degree of loss
aversion implies a lower investment in the risky asset for the more ambitious household, which
is what one would probably expect. See Tables 1 and 2 for the sensitivity results with respect
to loss aversion.
Effects of the habit persistence in consumption
The effect of persistence in consumption on happiness depends on whether the household’s first
period optimal consumption is above or below the reference level. Whatever is smaller – either
consumption or the reference level – should be followed more intensely (in the formation of
the second period reference level) in order to increase happiness. If first period consumption
is above the reference level, then increasing habit persistence in consumption makes the
household less happy while increasing persistence in the consumption reference level makes it
happier. Thus the household should intensify its persistence on the consumption target. This
situation applies to the less ambitious household and the more ambitious household with a
higher time preference. On the other hand, if first period consumption is below the reference
33The assumption on the degree of loss aversion to be sufficiently large is to guarantee that the maximum
of (P1) exceeds the potential maxima of (P2) and (P5).
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level, then growing habit persistence on consumption leads to more happiness while increasing
persistence on the consumption reference level results in less happiness. Hence the household
should stick more to its consumption habits. This applies to the more ambitious household
with a lower time preference.
For the less ambitious household the decrease in happiness materializes only through
a decline of the first period consumption (or, equivalently, through a decline of the first
period relative gains), as the second period relative gains actually increase with an increasing
persistence in consumption, see Table 1. On the other hand, for the more ambitious household
with a sufficiently small discount factor the decrease in happiness is triggered by a decrease of
both the first period relative gains and the second period relative gains when the good state
of nature occurs. Finally, for the more ambitious household with a sufficiently large discount
factor the increase in happiness is caused by a decrease of the relative losses in the first period
(for a sufficiently loss averse household) as well as by an increase of the relative gains in the
second period.
3.5 Implications for income taxation
Our analysis has important implications in terms of how a household responds to income
reductions due to the impact of taxation of endowment income.34 In fact an increase in the
tax rate is equivalent to a decrease in income in the model without taxes. The effects of
taxation will depend on whether the household has a low or a high first period consumption
reference level, hence on the type of household. Suppose suddenly income is taxed and
the household is less ambitious such that it only experiences relative gains. Then increased
taxation will reduce current consumption, future consumption in both states of nature, risk
taking, second period reference level, relative gains and happiness.
Suppose, then, the household is more ambitious with a high time preference (i.e., it values
more current consumption) and thus experiences relative losses in the bad state of nature in
the second period. Increased taxation of income in this case will increase current consumption,
risk taking, consumption in the good state of nature, the second period reference level, current
relative gains, second period relative gains in the good state of nature and second period
relative losses in the bad state of nature, which is opposite to the response of a less ambitious
household towards taxation of income. On the other hand, increased taxation will reduce
consumption in the bad state of nature as well as happiness.
Suppose, further, the household is more ambitious with a low time preference (i.e., it
values more future consumption) and is thus willing to experience relative losses in the first
period, then increased taxation will discourage current consumption but stimulate risk taking
while the direction of future consumption is ambiguous and happiness will decrease. In terms
34The corresponding model set-up is the same as presented by (6), only income is replaced by after-tax
income in all formulations, propositions and corollaries. I.e., Y1 is replaced by (1− τ )Y1 and Y2 is replaced by
(1− τ )Y2, where τ ∈ (0, 1) is the tax rate of income.
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of relative gains and losses increased taxation of income will increase relative losses in the
first period as well as relative gains in the future.
Finally, if the household is at the threshold level, i.e., if it is balanced, then a sudden
increase in taxation (while keeping all other parameters unchanged) will reduce the present
value of after-tax income and thus the threshold level of the current reference consumption
C¯U,P11 will shrink, which in turn makes the household more ambitious.
For the discussion of the effects of income taxes on savings it is reasonable to assume that
the tax rates on current and future income are not independent. For simplicity we assume
that they are the same. Then a higher income tax (which induces lower disposable income)
discourages savings for the more ambitious household with a high time preference, and it also
discourages savings for the less ambitious household and the more ambitious household with
a low time preference provided second period income is small enough.35 On the other hand, if
second period income is larger than the threshold then a higher tax rate stimulates savings for
the less ambitious household and the more ambitious household with a low time preference.
Note that if the household has a sufficiently large persistence in current consumption and the
second period is the retirement period then more plausible is the case when second period
income does not exceed its threshold.36
A particularly interesting result is the impact of taxation on risk taking. Taxation of
income will discourage risk taking for less ambitious households, while for more ambitious
households, irrespective of their rate of time preference, taxation will increase risk taking.
Finally, taxation makes a household less happy irrespective of its first period reference level.
dτ dC∗1 dC
∗
2g dC
∗
2b dα
∗ dC¯2 d|C
∗
1 − C¯1| d|C
∗
2g − C¯2| d|C
∗
2b − C¯2| dS
∗ dU∗
C¯1 < C¯
U,P1
1 < 0 < 0 < 0 < 0 < 0 < 0 < 0 < 0 ≶ 0 < 0
C¯1 > C¯
U,P1
1 , δ ≤ δ
P2−P5 > 0 > 0 < 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 < 0 < 0
C¯1 > C¯
U,P1
1 , δ > δ
P2−P5 < 0 ≶ 0 ≶ 0 > 0 < 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 ≶ 0 < 0
Table 3: Sensitivity results for less ambitious and more ambitious households with respect to
the income tax.
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper we analyze the two-period consumption-investment decision of a household with
prospect theory preferences and an endogenous second period reference level which captures
habit persistence in consumption and in the current consumption reference level. We find
that the optimal solution of a sufficiently loss averse household depends on how its first
period consumption reference level relates to a given threshold which is equal to the average
35In the latter case the household, in addition, needs to be sufficiently loss averse.
36The threshold is given by (1 + rf )wY1 + k˜, where k˜ ≥ 0.
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discounted endowment income. The reference level may be below, equal to, or above this
threshold and hence households can be of three types. These three types are characterized
by how their optimal consumption relates to their reference consumption. First there are
households with a relatively low reference level (less ambitious households), which can avoid
relative consumption losses in both periods. This means that they always consume above
their reference levels. Second there are balanced households with a neutral reference level,
which always consume exactly their reference levels. This type of household, however, is very
special and can only occur when its first period reference level is equal to the average of the
discounted income. Third there are households with a relatively high reference level (more
ambitious households), which cannot avoid to incur relative consumption losses, either now
or in the future. More precisely, a more ambitious household with a lower discount factor
(high time preference) will face relative losses in the second period in the bad state of nature
while a more ambitious household with a higher discount factor (low time preference) incurs
relative losses in the first period. Note that the three types of household sometimes act
very differently from one another and thus there is a diversity of behavior resulting from the
different levels of comparison.
We observe the following effects of habit persistence in consumption. A less ambitious
household will be less happy with a rising persistence in consumption, but at the same time
it will be happier with a rising persistence in the reference consumption. Hence it is better
to stick to one’s exogenously given consumption target than to one’s consumption habits.
The same applies to the more ambitious household with a high time preference. However,
the situation is reverse for the more ambitious household with a low time preference: it will
be happier if it sticks more to its consumption habits than to its target, i.e., if it intensifies
its consumption habits. In addition clinging to one’s consumption habits decreases current
consumption for the less ambitious household and the more ambitious household with a
relatively high time preference, while evidence is mixed for the more ambitious household
with a relatively low time preference.
It is always true that more income is better, i.e., the larger the income, the happier the
household – provided the first period reference level does not depend on income. However, if
the reference level depends on income in the sense that it is equal to a fraction of the present
value of total wealth and the household is more ambitious, then a higher income reduces
happiness. This is due to the fact that in this case the indirect effect of income (through the
first period reference level) outweighs the direct effect of income. We also observe that less
ambitious households increase their exposure to risky assets during good economic times (i.e.,
when their income increases) while the more ambitious households increase their exposure to
risky assets during bad economic times (i.e., when their income decreases).
Finally, we obtain the same findings as in Hlouskova, Fortin and Tsigaris (2017) related to
the dependence of happiness upon the current consumption reference level: the highest utility
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is achieved for the lowest current consumption reference level (while keeping everything else
unchanged). Thus, not comparing at all (e.g., to others) leads to the highest level of happiness.
We also discuss the effects of taxation of endowment income: increasing the tax rate in a
model with income taxes is actually equivalent to decreasing income in a model without taxes.
An interesting extension would certainly be to examine the household’s optimal consumption-
investment behavior if also capital income is taxed.
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Appendix A: Optimization problems
Before proceeding further, we introduce (or re-introduce) the following notation
Ω = (1 + rf )(Y1 − C¯1) + Y2 −
[
w0 + (w1 +w2)C¯1
]
= (1 + rf )Y1 + Y2 − w0 − (1 + rf + w1 + w2)C¯1
Kγ =
(1− p)(rf − rb)
1−γ
p (rg − rf )1−γ
k =
[
δ(1 + rf + w1) (1 − p)
(
rg − rb
rg − rf
)1−γ] 1γ
,
dk
drb
< 0,
dk
drg
< 0 (47)
k2 =
[
δ(1 + rf + w1) p
(
rg − rb
rf − rb
)1−γ] 1γ
=
k
K
1/γ
γ
,
dk2
drb
> 0,
dk2
drg
> 0
M =
[
δ(1 + rf + w1) p
rg − rb
rf − rb
] 1
γ rf − rb +K
1
γ
0 (rg − rf )
rg − rb
= k
[
1 +
(
1
Kγ
)1/γ]
= k2
(
1 +K1/γγ
)
= (1 + rf + w1)
(
λP1−P5
)1/γ
,
dM
drb
> 0,
dM
drg
> 0
M(λ) = k
[
λ1/γ −
(
1
Kγ
)1/γ]
= k2
[
(λKγ)
1/γ − 1
]
,
dM(λ)
drb
< 0,
dM(λ)
drg
< 0
C¯U,P11 =
(1 + rf )Y1 + Y2 − w0
1 + rf + w1 + w2
C¯U,P21 =
(rg − rb) [(1 + rf )Y1 + Y2]− (rf − rb)w0 − (rg − rf )C2L
(rg − rb)(1 + rf ) + (rf − rb)(w1 + w2)
C¯L,P41 =
(1 + rf + w1)C2L − w1[(1 + rf )Y1 + Y2]− (1 + rf )w0
(1 + rf )w2
(48)
C¯U,P41 = Y1 +
Y2 − C2L
1 + rf
(49)
C¯U,P51 =
(1 + rf )Y1 + Y2 − w0 − (1 + rf + w1)C1L
w2
(50)
C¯U,P61 =
1
w2
[
rg − rb
rf − rb
((1 + rf )(Y1 − C1L) + Y2 − C2L)− w0 − w1C1L + C2L
]
(51)
C¯
U,P6,(iii)
1 =
1
w2
[
rg − rb
rf − rb
((1 + rf )(Y1 − C1L) + Y2 − C2L)− w0 − (1 + rf + w1)C1L
]
(52)
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CU2L =
rg − rb
rg − rf
[
(1 + rf )(Y1 − C¯1) + Y2
]
−
rf − rb
rg − rf
[
w0 + (w1 + w2)C¯1
]
λP2 =


1+rf+w1
k +
(
1
Kγ
)1/γ
− (−Ω)
w0+(w1+w2)C¯1−C2L
w1
k
1− (−Ω)
w0+(w1+w2)C¯1−C2L
rg−rb
rg−rf


γ
=
[
1 + rf + w1
k
+
(
1
Kγ
)1/γ]γ
×
[
1
1+r+k2+w1
[
((1 + rf )(Y1 − C¯1) + Y2)w1 − (w0 + (w1 + w2)C¯1)(1 + rf + k2)
]
−C2L
CU2L − C2L
]γ
=
[
1 + rf + w1
k
+
(
1
Kγ
)1/γ]γ 1 +
rf−rb
rg−rf
+
1+rf+k2
1+rf+k2+w1
CU2L − C2L
(−Ω)


γ
for C2L < C
U
2L and C¯
U,P1
1 < C¯1 < C¯
U,P2
1
λP1−P2 =
[(
rf−rb
(rg−rb)(1+rf )+w1(rf−rb)
)1−γ
+ δp
] [
Ω+ (rg − rf )α
C1=C¯1
C2b=C2L
]1−γ
δ(1 − p)
[
w0 + (w1 + w2)C¯1 − C2L
]1−γ
−
Ω1−γ(1 + rf + w1 +M)
γ
δ(1 − p)(1 + rf +w1)
[
w0 + (w1 + w2)C¯1 − C2L
]1−γ for C¯1 ≤ C¯P11
λP2−P2 =
[(
rf−rb
(rg−rb)(1+rf )+w1(rf−rb)
)1−γ
+ δp
] [
Ω+ (rg − rf )α
C1=C¯1
C2b=C2L
]1−γ
δ(1 − p)
[(
w0 + (w1 + w2)C¯1 − C2L
)1−γ
−
(
rg−rb
rg−rf
)1−γ
(−Ω)1−γ
]
λP2−P4 =
1
δp
[
rf − rb
(1 + rf )(rg − rb) + w1(rf − rb)
]1−γ
λP4 =
1
w1 δ

w0 + w1
(
Y1 − C¯1 +
Y2−C2L
1+rf
)
+ (w1 + w2)C¯1 − C2L
αC1=C¯1C2b=C2L − α
C2g=C¯2
C2b=C2L
1 + rf
rf − rb


γ
for C¯1 < C¯
U,P2
1
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λP5 = λP1−P5

(1 + rf + w1)(C¯1 − C1L)
w2
(
C¯U,P51 − C¯1
)


γ
λP1−P5 =


k2
(
1 +K
1
γ
γ
)
1 + rf + w1


γ
=


k
(
1 +
(
1
Kγ
) 1
γ
)
1 + rf + w1


γ
=
(
M
1 + rf + w1
)γ
λP5−P2 =

 k1+rf+w1 1K1/γγ + 1
k
1+rf+w1
− 1


γ
for
k
1 + rf + w1
> 1 or when δ > δP2−P5 (53)
λP2−P6 =
δp
(
(1+rf )(rg−rb)
rf−rb
+w1
)2
[
Ω+(rg−rf )α
C1=C¯1
C2b=C2L
]1+γ
1
(C¯1−C1L)1+γ
+
δ(1−p)w21
[w0+(w1+w2)C¯1−C2L]
1+γ
δP2−P5 =
1
1− p
[
rg − rf
(1 + rf + w1)(rg − rb)
]1−γ
δ(λ)P2−P5
C¯1=C¯
U,P2
1
= δP2−P5
[
1−
(
λP1−P5
λ
)1/γ]γ
α
C2g=C¯2
C2b=C2L
=
(1 + rf + w1)
[
w0 + (w1 + w2)C¯1 − C2L
]
+ w1Ω
(1 + rf )(rg − rb) + w1(rf − rb)
=
(1 + rf )
(
w0 + w2C¯1 − C2L
)
+ w1 [(1 + rf )Y1 + Y2 − C2L]
(1 + rf )(rg − rb) + w1(rf − rb)
=
(1 + rf )
(
w0 + w2C¯1
)
+ w1 [(1 + rf )Y1 + Y2]− (1 + rf + w1)C2L
(1 + rf )(rg − rb) + w1(rf − rb)
(54)
=
(1 + rf )
[
w0 + (w1 + w2)C¯1 − C2L
]
+ w1
[
(1 + rf )(Y1 − C¯1) + Y2 − C2L
]
(1 + rf )(rg − rb) + w1(rf − rb)
αC1=C¯1C2b=C2L =
(1 + rf )(Y1 − C¯1) + Y2 − C2L
rf − rb
(55)
αC1=C1LC2b=C2L =
(1 + rf )(Y1 − C1L) + Y2 − C2L
rf − rb
(56)
αC1=C¯1
C2b=C¯2
=
Ω
rf − rb
=
(1 + rf )Y1 + Y2 − w0 − (1 + rf + w1 +w2)C¯1
rf − rb
(57)
αC1=C¯1
C2g=C¯2
=
−Ω
rg − rf
(58)
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αC1=C1L
C2g=C¯2
=
w0 + (1 + rf + w1)C1L + w2C¯1 − (1 + rf )Y1 − Y2
rg − rf
=
−Ω− (1 + rf + w1)(C¯1 − C1L)
rg − rf
(59)
αC1=C1L
C2b=C¯2
=
(1 + rf )Y1 + Y2 −w0 − (1 + rf +w1)C1L − w2C¯1
rf − rb
=
Ω+ (1 + rf + w1)(C¯1 − C1L)
rf − rb
(60)
αC2b=C¯2C2b=C2L =
1
rf − rb
[
(1 + rf )Y1 + Y2 − C2L +
1 + rf
w1
(
w0 + w2C¯1 − C2L
)]
(61)
The following lemma summarizes the basic properties of the threshold values for the reference
level C¯1 and for the risky investment α.
Lemma 1 (i) CU2L ≥
(w1+w2)[(1+rf )Y1+Y2]+(1+rf )w0
1+rf+w1+w2
⇐⇒ C¯1 ≤ C¯
U,P1
1 and
CU2L <
(w1+w2)[(1+rf )Y1+Y2]+(1+rf )w0
1+rf+w1+w2
⇐⇒ C¯1 > C¯
U,P1
1 .
(ii) If C2L ≤
1+rf
1+rf+w1
[
w0 + w1
(
Y1 +
Y2
1+rf
)
+ w2C¯1
]
then α
C2g=C¯2
C2b=C2L
≥ 0. However, C2L ≤
w0 + w1C1L + w2C¯1 is sufficient for α
C2g=C¯2
C2b=C2L
to be nonnegative.
(iii) If C¯1 < C¯
U,P2
1 then α
C1=C¯1
C2g=C¯2
< α
C2g=C¯2
C2b=C2L
< αC1=C¯1C2b=C2L .
If C¯1 = C¯
U,P2
1 then α
C1=C¯1
C2g=C¯2
= α
C2g=C¯2
C2b=C2L
= αC1=C¯1C2b=C2L .
(iv) If C¯1 = C¯
U,P2
1 then w0 + (w1 + w2)C¯
U,P2
1 − C2L = (rg − rb)α
C1=C¯1
C2b=C2L
.
(v) α
C2g=C¯2
C2b=C2L
≤ αC1=C1LC2b=C2L .
(vi) C¯1 < C¯
U,P5
1 ⇐⇒ α
C1=C1L
C2g=C¯2
< 0 and αC1=C1L
C2b=C¯2
> 0,
C¯1 < C¯
U,P4
1 ⇐⇒ α
C1=C¯1
C2b=C2L
≥ 0 and
C¯1 ≥ C¯
L,P4
1 ⇐⇒ α
C2g=C¯2
C2b=C2L
≥ 0.
(vii) αC1=C1L
C2g=C¯2
≤ α
C2g=C¯2
C2b=C2L
and αC1=C1LC2b=C2L ≥ α
C1=C1L
C2b=C¯2
.
(viii) C¯U,P11 < C¯
U,P2
1 < C¯
U,P4
1 ⇐⇒ C2L <
(w1+w2)[(1+rf )Y1+Y2]+(1+rf )w0
1+rf+w1+w2
,
C¯U,P11 = C¯
U,P2
1 = C¯
U,P4
1 ⇐⇒ C2L =
(w1+w2)[(1+rf )Y1+Y2]+(1+rf )w0
1+rf+w1+w2
and
C¯U,P41 < C¯
U,P2
1 < C¯
U,P1
1 ⇐⇒ C2L >
(w1+w2)[(1+rf )Y1+Y2]+(1+rf )w0
1+rf+w1+w2
.
(ix) (1 + rf )C1L +C2L ≤ (1 + rf )Y1 + Y2 implies that α
C1=C1L
C2b=C2L
≥ 0 and C¯U,P51 ≤ C¯
U,P6
1 .
(x) C1L ≤ C¯
U,P1
1 (assumption (62)) ⇐⇒ w0+(w1+w2)C1L ≤
(w1+w1)[(1+rf )Y1+Y2]+(1+rf )w0
1+rf+w1+w2
.
In addition, if C1L ≤ C¯
U,P1
1 then C¯
U,P1
1 ≤ C¯
U,P5
1 .
(xi) C1L <
(1+rf−w2)
(
Y1+
Y2
1+rf
)
−w0+
w2
1+rf
C2L
1+rf+w1
⇐⇒ C¯U,P41 ≤ C¯
U,P5
1 .
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(xii) Let C1L = CL ≥ 0, C2L =
CL
1+rf
, w0 = 0, w1 = (1 + rf )w and w2 = (1 + rf )(1 − w)
where w ∈ [0, 1]. Then C¯U,P21 ≤ C¯
U,P5
1 .
There are eight cases to consider:
(P1) C1 ≥ C¯1, C¯2 ≤ C2b ≤ C2g
(P2) C1 ≥ C¯1, C2L ≤ C2b ≤ C¯2 ≤ C2g
(P3) C1 ≥ C¯1, C2L ≤ C2g ≤ C¯2 ≤ C2b
(P4) C1 ≥ C¯1, C2L ≤ C2b ≤ C2g ≤ C¯2
(P5) C1L ≤ C1 ≤ C¯1, C¯2 ≤ C2b ≤ C2g
(P6) C1L ≤ C1 ≤ C¯1, C2L ≤ C2b ≤ C¯2 ≤ C2g
(P7) C1L ≤ C1 ≤ C¯1, C2L ≤ C2g ≤ C¯2 ≤ C2b
(P8) C1L ≤ C1 ≤ C¯1, C2L ≤ C2b ≤ C2g ≤ C¯2
Let the following assumptions hold
C1L ≤ min
{
(1 + rf )Y1 + Y2 − w0
1 + rf + w1 + w2
= C¯U,P11 , C¯1
}
(62)
C2L ≤ (1 + rf )C1L (63)
max{C1L, C2L} ≤ C¯1 (64)
Then the corresponding problems for C¯1 ≤ C¯
U,P2
1 are
Problem (P1):
Max(C1,α) : E(U(C1, α)) =
(C1−C¯1)1−γ
1−γ +δp
[(1+rf )Y1+Y2−w0−w2C¯1−(1+rf+w1)C1+(rg−rf )α]
1−γ
1−γ
+δ(1 − p)
[(1+rf )Y1+Y2−w0−w2C¯1−(1+rf+w1)C1−(rf−rb)α]
1−γ
1−γ
such that : C¯1 ≤ C1 ≤
1
1+rf+w1
[
(1 + rf )Y1 + Y2 − w0 − w2C¯1 − (rf − rb)α
]
0 ≤ α ≤ Ωrf−rb = α
C1=C¯1
C2b=C¯2


(P1)
Note that feasible solutions exist only when C1L ≤ C¯1 ≤ C¯
U,P1
1 . Note in addition that
assumptions (62) and (63) imply that C2L ≤ C¯2, namely,
C2L ≤ w0 + (w1 + w2)C1L ≤ w0 + w1C1 + w2C¯1 = C¯2
This applies to all problems (P1)–(P8).
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Problem (P2):
Max(C1,α) :E(U(C1, α)) =
(C1−C¯1)1−γ
1−γ +δp
[(1+rf )Y1+Y2−w0−w2C¯1−(1+rf+w1)C1+(rg−rf )α]
1−γ
1−γ
−λδ(1− p)
[(1+rf+w1)C1+(rf−rb)α−(1+rf )Y1−Y2+w0+w2C¯1]
1−γ
1−γ
(P2)
such that
1
1+rf+w1
[
(1 + rf )Y1 + Y2 −w0 − w2C¯1 − (rf − rb)α
]
≤ C1
1
1+rf+w1
[
(1 + rf )Y1 + Y2 − w0 − w2C¯1 + (rg − rf )α
]
≥ C1
C¯1 ≤ C1 ≤ Y1 +
1
1+rf
[Y2 − C2L − (rf − rb)α]
max
{
0, −Ωrg−rf = α
C1=C¯1
C2g=C¯2
}
≤ α ≤
(1+rf )(Y1−C¯1)+Y2−C2L
rf−rb
= αC1=C¯1C2b=C2L
Feasible solutions exist only if C¯1 ≤ min
{
C¯U,P21 , Y1 +
Y2−C2L
1+rf
}
.37 Note that for
C2L <
(w1+w2)[(1+rf )Y1+Y2]+(1+rf )w0
1+rf+w1+w2
, which follows from assumptions (62) and (63), see
Lemma 1-(x), is C¯U,P21 < Y1 +
Y2−C2L
1+rf
and C¯U,P11 ≤ C¯
U,P2
1 , see Lemma 1-(viii). Thus, the
necessary conditions for feasibility of (P2) are: C1L ≤ C¯1 ≤ C¯
U,P2
1 .
Note that in the case of problem (P3) C2b = C2g = C¯2 as C2b ≤ C2g. This and (4)
imply that the only feasible solution for Ω ≥ 0 is
(
C1 = C¯1 +
Ω
1+rf+w1
, α = 0
)
which is also
feasible for (P1)–(P4). There is no feasible solution for Ω < 0, i.e., when C¯1 > C¯
U,P1
1 .
Problem (P4):
Max(C1,α) : E(U(C1, α)) =
(C1−C¯1)1−γ
1−γ − λδp
((1+rf+w1)C1−(rg−rf )α−(1+rf )Y1−Y2+w0+w2C¯1)
1−γ
1−γ
−λδ(1− p)
((1+rf+w1)C1+(rf−rb)α−(1+rf )Y1−Y2+w0+w2C¯1)
1−γ
1−γ
such that : C1 ≥
1
1+rf+w1
[
(1 + rf )Y1 + Y2 − w0 − w2C¯1 + (rg − rf )α
]
C¯1 ≤ C1 ≤ Y1 +
1
1+rf
[Y2 − C2L − (rf − rb)α]
0 ≤ α ≤ α
C2g=C¯2
C2b=C2L


(P4)
37Constraint C¯1 ≤ C¯
U,P2
1 follows from α
C1=C¯1
C2g=C¯2
≤ α
C1=C¯1
C2b=C2L
and constraint C¯1 ≤ Y1 +
Y2−C2L
1+rf
follows from
0 ≤ αC1=C¯1C2b=C2L .
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where α
C2g=C¯2
C2b=C2L
is given by (54). Note that a necessary condition for the feasibility of (P4) is
α
C2g=C¯2
C2b=C2L
≥ 0 which is equivalent to
C¯1 ≥
(1 + rf +w1)C2L − w1[(1 + rf )Y1 + Y2]− (1 + rf )w0
(1 + rf )w2
= C¯L,P41
see Lemma 1-(vi), or to
C2L ≤
1 + rf
1 + rf + w1
[
w0 + w1
(
Y1 +
Y2
1 + rf
)
+ w2C¯1
]
Problem (P5):
Max(C1,α) : E(U(C1, α)) =
−λ (C¯1−C1)
1−γ
1−γ + δp
[(1+rf )Y1+Y2−(1+rf+w1)C1−w0−w2C¯1+(rg−rf )α]
1−γ
1−γ
+δ(1 − p)
[(1+rf )Y1+Y2−(1+rf+w1)C1−w0−w2C¯1−(rf−rb)α]
1−γ
1−γ
such that : C1L ≤ C1 ≤ min
{
1
1+rf+w1
[
(1 + rf )Y1 + Y2 − w0 − w2C¯1 − (rf − rb)α
]
, C¯1
}
0 ≤ α ≤
(1+rf )Y1+Y2−w0−w2C¯1−(1+rf+w1)C1L
rf−rb
= αC1=C1L
C2b=C¯2


(P5)
Note that (P5) is feasible only when C¯1 ≤ C¯
U,P5
1 , see Lemma 1-(vi).
Problem (P6):
Max(C1,α) : E(U(C1, α)) =
−λ (C¯1−C1)
1−γ
1−γ + δp
((1+rf )Y1+Y2−w0−w2C¯1−(1+rf+w1)C1+(rg−rf )α)
1−γ
1−γ
−λδ(1 − p)
((1+rf+w1)C1+(rf−rb)α−(1+rf )Y1−Y2+w0+w2C¯1)
1−γ
1−γ
such that : C1 ≤
1
1+rf+w1
[
(1 + rf )Y1 + Y2 − w0 − w2C¯1 + (rg − rf )α
]
C1 ≥
1
1+rf+w1
[
(1 + rf )Y1 + Y2 − w0 − w2C¯1 − (rf − rb)α
]
C1L ≤ C1 ≤ min
{
Y1 +
1
1+rf
[Y2 − C2L − (rf − rb)α] , C¯1
}
max
{
0, αC1=C1L
C2g=C¯2
, αC1=C¯1
C2b=C¯2
}
≤ α ≤ min
{
αC1=C1LC2b=C2L , α
C2b=C¯2
C2b=C2L
}


(P6)
where αC1=C1L
C2g=C¯2
is given by (59), αC1=C¯1
C2b=C¯2
is given by (57), αC1=C1LC2b=C2L is given by (56) and
αC2b=C¯2C2b=C2L is given by (61). Assumptions (62) and (63) imply that α
C1=C1L
C2b=C2L
≤ αC2b=C¯2C2b=C2L and
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Lemma 1-(ix) gives that the upper bound on α is nonnegative, i.e., αC1=C1LC2b=C2L ≥ 0.
Note that αC1=C¯1
C2b=C¯2
≤ αC1=C1LC2b=C2L holds if C¯1 ≥
(1+rf )C1L+C2L−w0
1+rf+w1+w2
and αC1=C1L
C2g=C¯2
≤ αC1=C1LC2b=C2L if
C¯1 ≤ C¯
U,P6
1 which is defined by (51). Thus, the set of feasible solutions for (P6) is non-empty
for
(1 + rf )C1L + C2L − w0
1 + rf + w1 + w2
≤ C¯1 ≤ C¯
U,P6
1
Note finally that for C¯1 ≤ min
{
C¯U,P21 , C¯
U,P5
1
}
is αC1=C1L
C2g=C¯2
≤ 0, see Lemma 1-(vi), and for
C¯1 ≤ C¯
U,P1
1 is α
C1=C¯1
C2b=C¯2
≥ 0. Thus the set of feasible solutions for α is as follows
if C1L ≤ C¯1 ≤ C¯
U,P1
1 then α
C1=C¯1
C2b=C¯2
≤ α ≤ αC1=C1LC2b=C2L
if C¯U,P11 ≤ C¯1 ≤ min
{
C¯U,P21 , C¯
U,P5
1
}
then 0 ≤ α ≤ αC1=C1LC2b=C2L
Problem (P7): Similarly as in (P3), C2b = C2g = C¯2 as C2b ≤ C2g and thus the only feasible
solution for C¯1 ≥ C¯
U,P1
1 (i.e., Ω ≤ 0) is
(
C1 = C¯1 +
Ω
1+rf+w1
, α = 0
)
if C1L ≤ C¯1 +
Ω
1+rf+w1
.
Note that this point is feasible also for (P5)–(P8). There is no feasible solution for C¯1 < C¯
U,P1
1
(Ω > 0).
Problem (P8):
Max(C1,α) : E(U(C1, α)) = −λ
(C¯1−C1)1−γ
1−γ − λδp
[−Ω+(1+rf+w1)(C1−C¯1)−(rg−rf )α]
1−γ
1−γ
−λδ(1 − p)
[−Ω+(1+rf+w1)(C1−C¯1)+(rf−rb)α]
1−γ
1−γ
such that : C1 ≥ max
{
1
1+rf+w1
[
(1 + rf )Y1 + Y2 − w0 − w2C¯1 + (rg − rf )α
]
, C1L
}
C1 ≤ min
{
Y1 +
1
1+rf
[Y2 − C2L − (rf − rb)α] , C¯1
}
0 ≤ α ≤ min
{
αC1=C1LC2b=C2L , α
C2g=C¯2
C2b=C2L
}
0 ≤ α ≤ −Ωrg−rf


(P8)
Note that the last inequality holds only if Ω ≤ 0, i.e., when C¯1 ≥ C¯
U,P1
1 . Thus, based on this
and Lemma 1-(vi), (P8) is feasible for
C¯1 ≥ max
{
C¯L,P41 , C¯
U,P1
1
}
As problems (P3) and (P7) are imbedded in other problems we can exclude them from
our analysis.
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Appendix B
Problem (P1). Let C¯1 ≤
(1+rf )Y1+Y2−w0
1+rf+w1+w2
= C¯U,P11 , i.e., (Ω ≥ 0) and C1 ≤ C¯1 +
Ω
1+rf+w1
.38
At first, we solve the concave programming problem (P1) as an unconstrained problem, i.e.,
we solve two equations in two unknown variables C1 and α, namely
dE(U)
dC1
= 0 and dE(U)dα = 0
(∇E(U) = 0), obtain the optimum solution (CP11 , α
P1) and finally verify that CP12b ≥ C¯2 and
CP12g ≥ C¯2, C
P1
1 ≥ C¯1 and 0 ≤ α
P1 ≤ Ωrf−rb , i.e., that the solution is also feasible.
The first order conditions are
1
1+rf+w1
dE(U)
dC1
= (C1−C¯1)
−γ
1+rf+w1
− δp
[
Ω− (1 + rf + w1)(C1 − C¯1) + (rg − rf )α
]
−γ
−δ(1− p)
[
Ω− (1 + rf + w1)(C1 − C¯1)− (rf − rb)α
]
−γ
= 0
dE(U)
dα = δp
[
Ω− (1 + rf + w1)(C1 − C¯1) + (rg − rf )α
]
−γ
(rg − rf )
−δ(1− p)
[
Ω− (1 + rf + w1)(C1 − C¯1)− (rf − rb)α
]
−γ
(rf − rb) = 0


(65)
dE(U)
dα = 0 from (65) implies the following
p
[
Ω− (1 + rf + w1)(C1 − C¯1)− (rf − rb)α
]γ
(rg − rf )
= (1− p)
[
Ω− (1 + rf + w1)(C1 − C¯1) + (rg − rf )α
]γ
(rf − rb)
which after using the definition of Kγ , as given by (10), gives
K
−
1
γ
0
[
Ω− (1 + rf + w1)(C1 − C¯1)− (rf − rb)α
]
= Ω− (1 + rf + w1)(C1 − C¯1) + (rg − rf )α
This implies that
α =
1−K
1
γ
0
rf − rb +K
1
γ
0 (rg − rf )
[
Ω− (1 + rf + w1)(C1 − C¯1)
]
(66)
38There is no feasible solution for (P1) if C¯1 > C¯
U,P1
1 or if C1 > C¯1+
Ω
1+rf+w1
. If the latter inequality holds
then C2b < C¯2 which is infeasible in (P1).
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If we plug the last expression for α into the C1 part of the FOC in (65) we obtain
(C1 − C¯1)
−γ
δ(1 + rf + w1)
= p

Ω− (1 + rf + w1)(C1 − C¯1) +
(
1−K
1
γ
0
)
(rg − rf )
rf − rb +K
1
γ
0 (rg − rf )
(
Ω− (1 + rf + w1)(C1 − C¯1)
)


−γ
+(1− p)

Ω− (1 + rf + w1)(C1 − C¯1)−
(
1−K
1
γ
0
)
(rf − rb)
rf − rb +K
1
γ
0 (rg − rf )
(
Ω− (1 + rf + w1)(C1 − C¯1)
)


−γ
=

 rf − rb +K
1
γ
0 (rg − rf )(
Ω− (1 + rf +w1)(C1 − C¯1)
)
(rg − rb)


γ
p
rg − rb
rf − rb
under the assumption that Ω − (1 + rf + w1)(C1 − C¯1) > 0 which is equivalent to C1 <
C¯1 +
Ω
1+rf+w1
.39
After some simplifications we obtain
Ω− (1 + rf + w1)(C1 − C¯1) = (C1 − C¯1)
rf − rb +K
1
γ
0 (rg − rf )
rg − rb
[
δ(1 + rf + w1)p
rg − rb
rf − rb
] 1
γ
= (C1 − C¯1)M (67)
which gives
C1 = C¯1 +
Ω
1 + rf + w1 +M
= CP11
as given by (17). Note that (17) and the assumption Ω ≥ 0 imply that CP11 ≥ C¯1. In addition,
after plugging CP11 into (66) we obtain α
P1 as given in (18). It is also easy to verify that
upper bounds on CP11 and α
P1, as given in (P1), are satisfied. Note finally that αP1 ≥ 0 as
K0 < 1 which follows from E(r) > rf .
Using (65), it is easy to verify that d
2
E(U)
dC21
< 0, d
2
E(U)
dα2
< 0, and ∇2E(U(C1, C2)) =
d2E(U)
dC21
d2E(U)
dα2
−
(
d2E(U)
dC1dα
)2
> 0 and thus problem (P1) is a concave programming problem and
(CP11 , α
P1) is its unique global maximum.
Finally, CP12g and C
P1
2b can be written as
CP12g = w0 + (w1 +w2)C¯1 +
[
w1 + k2
rg − rb
rf − rb
]
Ω
1 + rf + w1 +M
(68)
CP12b = w0 + (w1 +w2)C¯1 +
[
w1 + k2K
1
γ
0
rg − rb
rf − rb
]
Ω
1 + rf + w1 +M
(69)
39Note that the optimal solution satisfies this inequality.
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and thus
CP12g − C¯2 = k2
rg − rb
rf − rb
×
Ω
1 + rf + w1 +M
≥ 0
CP12b − C¯2 = k2K
1
γ
0
rg − rb
rf − rb
×
Ω
1 + rf + w1 +M
≥ 0
It can be shown that
(1− γ)E(U(CP11 , α
P1)) =
Ω1−γ
1 + rf + w1
(1 + rf + w1 +M)
γ
=
(
Ω
1 + rf + w1
)1−γ [
1 +
(
λP1−P5
)1/γ]γ
(70)
where λP1−P5 is given by (13).
As we have already mentioned the only feasible solution for C1 = C¯1 +
Ω
1+rf+w1
is(
C1 = C¯1 +
Ω
1+rf+w1
, α = 0
)
with
(1− γ)E
(
U
(
C¯1 +
Ω
1 + rf + w1
, 0
))
=
(
Ω
1 + rf + w1
)1−γ
for C¯1 ≤ C¯
U,P1
1 (71)
which is below the value of the expected utility function at (CP11 , α
P1
1 ) as M > 0 and w1 > 0.
Thus, the maximum of (P1) is reached at (CP11 , α
P1). Note that as C2g = C2b = C¯2 for(
C1 = C¯1 +
Ω
1+rf+w1
, α = 0
)
then this point is feasible also for problems (P2)–(P4) if C¯1 ≤
C¯U,P11 (i.e., Ω ≥ 0) and is feasible also for problems (P5)–(P8) if C¯1 > C¯
U,P1
1 (i.e., Ω < 0)
where
(1− γ)E
(
U
(
C1 = C¯1 +
Ω
1 + rf + w1
, α = 0
))
=
(
−Ω
1 + rf + w1
)1−γ
for C¯1 > C¯
U,P1
1 (72)
for C1L ≤
(1+rf )Y1+Y2−w0−w2C¯1
1+rf+w1
and C¯1 ≤
(1+rf )Y1+Y2−w0
w2
.40 Note in addition that for C¯1 =
C¯U,P11 (i.e., Ω = 0) is
(
CP11 = C¯1, α
P1 = 0
)
which is feasible for all problems (P1)–(P8).
Sensitivity analysis.
Equations (68) and (69) imply that
dCP12s
dC¯1
= k2Ds + (1 + rf )w2 (73)
40To guarantee that the upper bound on C1L is nonnegative.
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where s ∈ {b, g} and
Ds =


(w1 + w2)
(
1 +K
1/γ
γ
)
−
rg−rb
rf−rb
(1 + rf + w1 + w2), for s = g
= −
(w1+w2)(rg−rf )
(
1−K
1/γ
0
)
+(1+rf )(rg−rb)
rf−rb
< 0
(w1 + w2)
(
1 +K
1/γ
γ
)
−
rg−rb
rf−rb
(1 + rf + w1 + w2)K
1/γ
0 , for s = b
= (w1 + w2)
(
1−K
1/γ
0
)
− (1 + rf )
(
K
1/γ
0 +K
1/γ
γ
)
(74)
Equations (73) and (74) imply that for s = g
dCP12g
dC¯1


< 0, for k2 >
(1+rf )w2
−Dg
⇔ δ > δ¯g
= 0, for k2 =
(1+rf )w2
−Dg
⇔ δ = δ¯g
> 0, for k2 <
(1+rf )w2
−Dg
⇔ δ < δ¯g
(75)
where
δ¯g =
[
(1 + rf )w2
−Dg
]γ (rf − rb
rg − rb
)1−γ 1
(1 + rf + w1)p
=

 w2
(w1+w2)(rg−rf )
(1+rf )(rg−rb)
+ 1


γ (
rf − rb
rg − rb
)
1
(1 + rf + w1)p
Equations (73) and (74) imply that for i = b
dCP12b
dC¯1


< 0, for
(
k2 >
(1+rf )w2
−Db
and Db < 0
)
⇔
(
δ > δ¯b and Db < 0
)
= 0, for
(
k2 =
(1+rf )w2
−Db
and Db < 0
)
⇔
(
δ = δ¯b and Db < 0
)
> 0, for Db > 0 or
for
(
k2 <
(1+rf )w2
−Db
and Db < 0
)
⇔
(
δ < δ¯b and Db < 0
)
(76)
where
δ¯b =
[
(1 + rf )w2
−Db
]γ (rf − rb
rg − rb
)1−γ 1
(1 + rf + w1)p
for Db < 0 which is equivalent to w1+w2 < (1+ rf )
K
1/γ
0 +K
1/γ
γ
1−K
1/γ
0
. Note that the following holds
when w1 + w2 = 1 + rf
Db


< 0, for p < p¯
= 0, for p = p¯
> 0 for p > p¯
(77)
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where
p¯ =
(rf − rb)
1−γ [rg − rf + 2(rf − rb)]
γ
(rf − rb)1−γ [rg − rf + 2(rf − rb)]γ + rg − rf
Under this condition, i.e., when w1 = (1 + rf )w, w2 = (1 + rf )(1 − w) and w ∈ [0, 1], it can
also be shown that for sufficiently large w are the threshold values for δ, namely δ¯b and δ¯g
smaller than one, i.e., both CP12b and C
P1
2g can be both increasing or decreasing with respect
to C¯1, see (76) and (75). However, based on (77) this applies to C
P1
2b only for p < p¯. For a
sufficiently large p (p > p¯) is CP12b increasing with respect to C¯1.
Problem (P2). Let C¯1 ≤ C¯
U,P2
1 .
We proceed in the following way: At first we solve problem (P2) as an unconstrained
problem i.e., we solve ∇E(U) = 0, so that the FOC are satisfied, obtain the unique solution
(CP21 , α
P2), verify that the objective function of (P2) is concave at (CP21 , α
P2) and that
the solution is also feasible. As the utility function is differentiable at the domain under
consideration, (CP21 , α
P2) is the only local extremum (namely a local maximum) and if the
objective function at the border of (P2) does not exceed its value at (CP21 , α
P2), then this
point is also a global maximum of (P2) when λ > λP2 and C¯U,P11 ≤ C¯1 ≤ C¯
U,P2
1 . For
C¯1 ≤ C¯
U,P1
1 is the maximum reached at the border.
The first order conditions are
dE(U)
dC1
= (C1 − C¯1)
−γ
−δp
[
Ω− (1 + rf + w1)(C1 − C¯1) + (rg − rf )α
]
−γ
(1 + rf + w1)
−λδ(1− p)
[
(1 + rf + w1)(C1 − C¯1)− Ω+ (rf − rb)α
]
−γ
(1 + rf + w1) = 0
dE(U)
dα = δp
[
Ω− (1 + rf +w1)(C1 − C¯1) + (rg − rf )α
]
−γ
(rg − rf )
−λδ(1− p)
[
(1 + rf + w1)(C1 − C¯1)− Ω+ (rf − rb)α
]
−γ
(rf − rb) = 0


(78)
dE(U)
dα = 0 from (78) implies the following
p
[
(1 + rf + w1)(C1 − C¯1)−Ω+ (rf − rb)
]γ
(rg − rf )
= λ(1− p)
[
Ω− (1 + rf + w1)(C1 − C¯1) + (rg − rf )α
]γ
(rf − rb)
which gives
(
1
K0
) 1
γ [
(1 + rf + w1)(C1 − C¯1)− Ω+ (rf − rb)α
]
= λ
1
γ
[
Ω− (1 + rf + w1)(C1 − C¯1) + (rg − rf )α
]
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This implies that
α =
λ
1
γ +
(
1
K0
) 1
γ
λ
1
γ (rg − rf )−
(
1
K0
) 1
γ
(rf − rb)
[
(1 + rf + w1)(C1 − C¯1)− Ω
]
=
λ
1
γ +
(
1
K0
) 1
γ
(
λ
1
γ −
(
1
Kγ
) 1
γ
)
(rg − rf )
[
(1 + rf + w1)(C1 − C¯1)− Ω
]
(79)
for λ > 1Kγ . If we plug the last expression for α into the C1 part of the FOC in (78) we obtain
(C1 − C¯1)
−γ
δ(1 + rf + w1)
=
[
w0 +w2C¯1 − (1 + rf )Y1 − Y2 + (1 + rf + w1)C1
]
−γ
×

p


(
1
K0
) 1
γ
+
(
1
Kγ
) 1
γ
λ
1
γ −
(
1
Kγ
) 1
γ


−γ
+ λ(1− p)

1 + λ
1
γ +
(
1
K0
) 1
γ
λ
1
γ −
(
1
Kγ
) 1
γ
rf − rb
rg − rf


−γ
After some simplifications we obtain
(1 + rf +w1)(C1 − C¯1)− Ω
= (C1 − C¯1)
[
δ(1 + rf + w1)(1− p)
(
rg − rb
rg − rf
)1−γ] 1γ [
λ
1
γ −
(
1
Kγ
) 1
γ
]
= (C1 − C¯1)M(λ) (80)
which gives
C1 = C
P2
1 ≡ C¯1 +
(−Ω)
M(λ)− 1− rf − w1
In addition, after plugging CP21 into (79) we obtain
α = αP2 ≡
[(
1
K0
)1/γ
+ λ1/γ
]
k
rg − rf
(
CP21 − C¯1
)
Note that CP21 > C¯1 if Ω < 0 and λ >
[
1+rf+w1
k +
(
1
Kγ
)1/γ]γ
(i.e., M(λ) > 1 + rf + w1) or
if Ω > 0 and λ <
[
1+rf+w1
k +
(
1
Kγ
)1/γ]γ
(i.e., M(λ) < 1 + rf + w1).
What remains to be shown is when the expected utility function is strictly concave at
(CP21 , α
P2). For this to hold it is sufficient to show that the following holds at (CP21 , α
P2):
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d2E(U)
dα2
< 0 and D ≡ ∇2E(U(C1, C2)) =
d2E(U)
dC21
d2E(U)
dα2
−
(
d2E(U)
dC1dα
)2
> 0. Note that
CP22g − C¯2 =
k(−Ω)
M(λ) − 1− rf − w1
rg − rb
rg − rf
(
1
K0
) 1
γ
(81)
C¯2 − C
P2
2b =
k(−Ω)
M(λ) − 1− rf − w1
rg − rb
rg − rf
λ
1
γ (82)
which are positive for either C¯U,P11 < C¯1 ≤ C¯
U,P2
1 (Ω < 0) and λ >
[
1+rf+w1
k +
(
1
Kγ
)1/γ]γ
or
for C¯1 < C¯
U,P1
1 (Ω > 0) and λ <
[
1+rf+w1
k +
(
1
Kγ
)1/γ]γ
.41 Thus, C¯2−C
P2
2b = (K0λ)
1
γ (CP22g −
C¯2). Using (78), (81) and (82) we obtain the following
1
γ
d2E(U)
dC21
|(C1,α)=(CP21 ,αP2)
=
[
−Ω
M(λ)− 1− rf − w1
]
−1−γ
×
[
−1 +
1 + rf + w1
k
(
rg − rf
rg − rb
)2(
λ
−
1
γ −K
1
γ
0
rf − rb
rg − rf
)]
(83)
1
γ
d2E(U)
dα2
|(C1,α)=(CP21 ,αP2)
=
(rf − rb)
2
k(1 + rf )
(
rg − rf
rg − rb
)2 [ −Ω
M(λ)− 1− rf − w1
]
−1−γ (
λ−
1
γ −K
1
γ
γ
)
(84)
1
γ
d2E(U)
dC1dα
|(C1,α)=(CP21 ,αP2)
=
rf − rb
k
(
rg − rf
rg − rb
)2 [ −Ω
M(λ)− 1− rf −w1
]
−1−γ (
λ
−
1
γ +K
1
γ
0
)
Note that (84) and λ > 1Kγ imply that
d2E(U)
dα2
|(C1,α)=(CP21 ,αP2)
< 0. In addition,
1
γ2
[
−Ω
M(λ)− 1− rf − w1
]2(1+γ)
D =
[
−1 +
1 + rf + w1
k
(
rg − rf
rg − rb
)2(
λ
−
1
γ −
rf − rb
rg − rf
K
1
γ
0
)]
×
rf − rb
k(1 + rf + w1)
(
rg − rf
rg − rb
)2 [
(rf − rb)λ
−
1
γ − (rg − rf )K
1
γ
0
]
−
(
rf − rb
k
)2(rg − rf
rg − rb
)4(
λ
−
1
γ +K
1
γ
0
)2
and thus
1
γ2
[
−Ω
M(λ)− 1− rf − w1
]2(1+γ) ( rg − rb
rg − rf
)2 k
rf − rb
D =
1
1 + rf + w1
[
(rg − rf )K
1
γ
0 − (rf − rb)λ
−
1
γ
]
41For C¯1 = C¯
U,P1
1 (Ω = 0) is C
P2
1 = C¯1, C
P2
2g = C
P2
2b = C¯2 = w0 + (w1 + w2)C¯1 and α
P2 = 0.
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+
1
k
(
rg − rf
rg − rb
)2(
λ
−
1
γ −
rf − rb
rg − rf
K
1
γ
0
)[
(rf − rb)λ
−
1
γ − (rg − rf )K
1
γ
0
]
−
rf − rb
k
(
rg − rf
rg − rb
)2(
λ−
1
γ +K
1
γ
0
)2
After some derivations we obtain
1
γ2
[
−Ω
M(λ)− 1− rf − w1
]2(1+γ) ( rg − rb
rg − rf
)2 k
rf − rb
D =
1
1 + rf + w1
[
(rg − rf )K
1
γ
0 − (rf − rb)λ
−
1
γ
]
−
rg − rf
k
λ−
1
γK
1
γ
0
Now it can be easily shown that if C¯U,P11 < C¯1 ≤ C¯
U,P2
1 and λ >
[
1+rf+w1
k +
(
1
Kγ
) 1
γ
]γ
then
D > 0 and thus the local maximum is reached at
(
CP21 , α
P2
)
. There is no local maximum for
C¯1 < C¯
U,P1
1 and thus in this case the maximum occurs at the border.
Thus, for analyzing the feasibility of
(
CP21 , α
P2
)
we assume that C¯U,P11 < C¯1 ≤ C¯
U,P2
1
and C2L ≤
[(w1+w2)(1+rf )Y1+Y2]+(1+rf )w0
1+rf+w1+w2
(see Lemma 1-(viii)). Note that (81) and (82) imply
that CP22g > C¯2 and C
P2
2b < C¯2 only when M(λ) − 1 − rf − w1 > 0 which holds for λ >[
1+rf+w1
k +
(
1
Kγ
) 1
γ
]γ
. In addition, C2L ≤ C
U
2L and λ ≥ λ
P2 imply that CP22b ≥ C2L. In more
detail, CP22b = (1 + rf )(Y1 − C
P2
1 ) + Y2 − (rf − rb)α
P2 ≥ C2L if
λ1/γ
[
w0 + (w1 + w2)C¯1 − C2L
−Ω
−
rg − rb
rg − rf
]
≥
w0 + (w1 +w2)C¯1 − C2L
−Ω
[
1 + rf +w1
k
+
(
1
Kγ
)1/γ]
−
w1
k
(85)
For C2L < C
U
2L is the left-hand-side in (85) positive and thus (85) holds for λ ≥ λ
P2. If,
on the other hand, C2L > C
U
2L then the left-hand-side in (85) is negative and there are two
possibilities for the right-hand-side: if it is non-negative then λ1/γ is non-positive and thus
infeasible; if, on the other hand, the right-hand-side in (85) is non-positive then
λ1/γ ≤
−Ωw1k +
[
C2L − w0 − (w1 + w2)C¯1
] [1+rf+w1
k +
(
1
Kγ
)1/γ]
rg−rb
rg−rf
(−Ω) + C2L −w0 − (w1 + w2)C¯1
=
(
λP2
)1/γ
and it can be shown that the right-hand-side of the last inequality is below
1+rf+w1
k +
(
1
Kγ
)1/γ
which then contradicts the other feasibility assumption, namely CP22g ≥ C¯2 and C
P2
2b < C¯2
that imply λ >
[
1+rf+w1
k +
(
1
Kγ
) 1
γ
]γ
.
If these conditions are not satisfied then the maximum will be reached at the border. Note
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in addition that
(1− γ)E
(
U
(
CP21 , α
P2
))
=
[
−Ω
M(λ)− 1− rf − w1
]1−γ [
1 +
k
1 + rf + w1
((
1
Kγ
) 1
γ
− λ
1
γ
)]
= −
(−Ω)1−γ
1 + rf + w1
[M(λ)− 1− rf − w1]
γ (86)
What remains to show is that feasible solutions at the border do not exceed the expected
utility at (CP21 , α
P2), where (P2) obtains its local maximum for C¯U,P11 < C¯1 ≤ C¯
U,P2
1 as well
as to analyze feasible solutions at the border for C¯1 ≤ C¯
U,P1
1 . The feasible solutions at the
border that come into consideration are: (i) C2g = C¯2, (ii) C2b = C¯2, (iii) C2b = C2L and (iv)
C1 = C¯1.
Note that for C¯1 = C¯
U,P1
1 , i.e., Ω = 0, is C
P2
1 = C¯
U,P1
1 and α
P2 = 0. As this is the
inflation point then the maximum in this case will be reached at the border.
Case (i). C2g = C¯2 when
C1 =
1
1 + rf + w1
[
(1 + rf )Y1 + Y2 − w0 − w2C¯1 + (rg − rf )α
]
= C¯1 +
Ω+ (rg − rf )α
1 + rf + w1
and max
{
0, −Ωrg−rf
}
≤ α ≤ α
C2g=C¯2
C2b=C2L
where α
C2g=C¯2
C2b=C2L
is given by (54).
Note that condition α ≥ −Ωrg−rf follows from C1 ≥ C¯1 and the upper bound on α follows
from C2b ≥ C2L. It can be seen that
(1− γ)E
(
U
(
C¯1 +
Ω+ (rg − rf )α
1 + rf + w1
, α
))
=
(
Ω+ (rg − rf )α
1 + rf + w1
)1−γ
− λδ(1 − p)(rg − rb)
1−γα1−γ (87)
Let Ω ≥ 0, i.e., C¯1 ≤ C¯
U,P1
1 . Then the potential maximum occurs either at α = 0 or
α = α
C2g=C¯2
C2b=C2L
or at the stationary point of the function given by (87) which can be easily
derived and has the value α = α¯ ≡ kλ
1
γ
1+rf+w1−kλ
1
γ
Ω
rg−rf
when λ <
(
1+rf+w1
k
)γ
and is infeasible
for λ >
(
1+rf+w1
k
)γ
. Thus, for λ <
(
1+rf+w1
k
)γ
(1− γ)E
(
U
(
C1 = C¯1 +
Ω+ (rg − rf )α¯
1 + rf + w1
, α¯
))
=
Ω1−γ
1 + rf + w1
(
1 + rf + w1 − kλ
1
γ
)γ
≤
(
Ω
1 + rf +w1
)1−γ
= (1− γ)E
(
U
(
C¯1 +
Ω
1 + rf + w1
, 0
))
therefore point
(
C1 = C¯1 +
Ω+(rg−rf )α¯
1+rf+w1
, α¯
)
can not be a maximum of the main problem (6)
as its utility function is below the utility function of
(
C¯1 +
Ω
1+rf+w1
, 0
)
which is feasible for
(P1) and also corresponds to the case when α = 0.
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The end-point α = α
C2g=C¯2
C2b=C2L
, which gives C2b = C2L, is dealt with in case (iii) where it
was shown that it can not be the point of the maxima.
Let Ω < 0, i.e., C¯U,P11 < C¯1 ≤ C¯
U,P2
1 . Then
−Ω
rg−rf
≤ α
C2g=C¯2
C2b=C2L
only if C2L ≤ C
U
2L. The
potential maximum occurs either at α = −Ωrg−rf or at α = α
C2g=C¯2
C2b=C2L
or at the stationary point
α = α¯ = kλ
1
γ
kλ
1
γ −1−rf−w1
(−Ω)
rg−rf
. As
lim
α→+ −Ω
rg−rf
dE
(
U
(
C¯1 +
Ω+(rg−rf )α
1+rf+w1
α, α
))
dα
= +∞
then the maximum can not occur at α = −Ωrg−rf . Regarding the stationary point α¯, note that
the value of the utility for λ >
(
1+rf+w1
k
)γ
is
(1− γ)E
(
U
(
C¯1 +
Ω+ (rg − rf )α¯
1 + rf + w1
, α¯
))
= −
(−Ω)1−γ
1 + rf + w1
(
kλ
1
γ − 1− rf − w1
)γ
(88)
It is easy to see that the utility at this stationary point is below the utility at (CP21 , α
P2), as
given by (86). It can be also verified that the objective function as given by (87) obtains its
local maximum at α = α¯. Finally, α¯ is feasible if α¯ ≤ α
C2g=C¯2
C2b=C2L
which holds if
λ ≥

1 + rf + w1
k
×
CU2L − C2L +
(
1+rf
1+rf+w1
+
rf−rb
rg−rf
)
(−Ω)
CU2L − C2L


γ
≡ λP2(i)
As λP2(i) < λ
P2 then for λ ≥ λP2 > λP2(i) is α¯ feasible and is the point of the maximum for (87)
which does not exceed the value of the objective function at
(
CP21 , α
P2
)
.
Case (ii). Any feasible solution of this case is also a feasible solution of (P1).
Case (iii). C2b = C2L when C1 = Y1 +
Y2−C2L
1+rf
−
rf−rb
1+rf
α and
α
C2g=C¯2
C2b=C2L
≤ α ≤
(1 + rf )(Y1 − C¯1) + Y2 −C2L
rf − rb
= αC1=C¯1C2b=C2L
where α
C2g=C¯2
C2b=C2L
is given by (54). Note that the lower bound on α is below its upper bound
only if C¯1 ≤ C¯
U,P2
1 .
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It can be seen that
(1− γ)E
(
U
(
Y1 +
Y2 −C2L
1 + rf
−
rf − rb
1 + rf
α, α
))
=
[
Y1 − C¯1 +
Y2 − C2L
1 + rf
−
rf − rb
1 + rf
α
]1−γ
+ δp
[
1 + rf +w1
1 + rf
C2L −w0 − w1
(
Y1 +
Y2
1 + rf
)
− w2C¯1 +
(
rg − rb +
rf − rb
1 + rf
w1
)
α
]1−γ
− λδ(1 − p)
[
w0 + w1
(
Y1 +
Y2
1 + rf
)
+ w2C¯1 −
1 + rf + w1
1 + rf
C2L −
w1(rf − rb)
1 + rf
α
]1−γ
(89)
Based on (89) we obtain for C¯1 ≤ C¯
U,P1
1 and α ∈
[
α
C2g=C¯2
C2b=C2L
, αC1=C¯1C2b=C2L
]
(1− γ)E
(
U
(
Y1 +
Y2 −C2L
1 + rf
−
rf − rb
1 + rf
α, α
))
≤
[
Y1 − C¯1 +
Y2 − C2L
1 + rf
−
rf − rb
1 + rf
α
C2g=C¯2
C2b=C2L
]1−γ
+ δp
[
1 + rf +w1
1 + rf
C2L −w0 − w1
(
Y1 +
Y2
1 + rf
)
− w2C¯1 +
(
rg − rb +
rf − rb
1 + rf
w1
)
αC1=C¯1C2b=C2L
]1−γ
− λδ(1 − p)
[
w0 + w1
(
Y1 +
Y2
1 + rf
)
+ w2C¯1 −
1 + rf + w1
1 + rf
C2L −
w1(rf − rb)
1 + rf
αC1=C¯1C2b=C2L
]1−γ
=
[
rf − rb
(1 + rf )(rg − rb) + w1(rf − rb)
]1−γ [
Ω+ (rg − rf )α
C1=C¯1
C2b=C2L
]1−γ
+δp
[
Ω+ (rg − rf )α
C1=C¯1
C2b=C2L
]1−γ
− λδ(1 − p)
[
w0 + (w1 + w2)C¯1 − C2L
]1−γ
(90)
and thus if the right-hand-side of (90) is below (1− γ)E
(
U
(
CP11 , α
P1
))
then also
E
(
U
(
Y1 +
Y2−C2L
1+rf
−
rf−rb
1+rf
α, α
))
< E
(
U
(
CP11 , α
P1
))
for C¯1 ≤ C¯
U,P1
1 , α ∈
[
α
C2g=C¯2
C2b=C2L
, αC1=C¯1C2b=C2L
]
and for
λ >
[(
rf−rb
(rg−rb)(1+rf )+w1(rf−rb)
)1−γ
+ δp
] [
Ω+ (rg − rf )α
C1=C¯1
C2b=C2L
]1−γ
δ(1 − p)
[
w0 + (w1 + w2)C¯1 − C2L
]1−γ
−
Ω1−γ(1 + rf + w1 +M)
γ
δ(1− p)(1 + rf + w1)
[
w0 + (w1 + w2)C¯1 −C2L
]1−γ = λP1−P2 (91)
Note that these are sufficient conditions for the expected utility of case (iii) not to exceed the
maximum of (P1). As we could not find an explicit solution (maximum) of (89) we tackled
it by imposing a lower bound on λ, which is in line with our goal to deal with loss averse
households.
In a similar way it can be shown that for C¯U,P11 < C¯1 < C¯
U,P2
1 is E
(
U
(
Y1 +
Y2−C2L
1+rf
−
rf−rb
1+rf
α, α
))
<
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E
(
U
(
CP21 , α
P2
))
for all α ∈
[
α
C2g=C¯2
C2b=C2L
, αC1=C¯1C2b=C2L
]
when42
λ >
[(
rf−rb
(rg−rb)(1+rf )+w1(rf−rb)
)1−γ
+ δp
] [
Ω+ (rg − rf )α
C1=C¯1
C2b=C2L
]1−γ
δ(1 − p)
[(
w0 + (w1 + w2)C¯1 − C2L
)1−γ
−
(
rg−rb
rg−rf
)1−γ
(−Ω)1−γ
] = λP2−P2 (92)
Case (iv). C1 = C¯1 and thus
(1− γ)E
(
U
(
C¯1, α
))
= δp [Ω + (rg − rf )α]
1−γ − λδ(1− p) [−Ω+ (rf − rb)α]
1−γ (93)
Let Ω ≥ 0, i.e., C¯1 ≤ C¯
U,P1
1 . Then the set of feasible solutions is:
Ω
rf−rb
≤ α ≤
(1+rf )(Y1−C¯1)+Y2−C2L
rf−rb
. The left end point α = Ωrf−rb follows from C2b = C¯2 and is thus feasible
also for (P1) while the right end point α =
(1+rf )(Y1−C¯1)+Y2−C2L
rf−rb
is implied by C2b = C2L
and thus was tackled in case (iii). What remains to investigate is the stationary point
α¯ =
1+λ1/γK
1/γ
0
1−λ1/γK
1/γ
γ
Ω
rf−rb
for λ < 1Kγ so α¯ ≥ 0. It can be shown that α¯ is the point of max-
ima only when λ > 1Kγ which contradicts the feasibility. Thus, α¯ can not be the point of local
maxima.
Let Ω < 0, i.e., C¯U,P11 < C¯1 ≤ C¯
U,P2
1 . Then the set of feasible solutions is: −
Ω
rg−rf
≤ α ≤
(1+rf )(Y1−C¯1)+Y2−C2L
rf−rb
. The following can be easily shown
lim
α→+ −Ω
rg−rf
dE
(
U
(
C¯1, α
))
dα
= +∞ (94)
and
dE
(
U
(
C¯1, α
))
dα
∣∣∣
α=α¯
= 0
for
α¯ =
λ
1
γ +
(
1
K0
) 1
γ
λ
1
γ −
(
1
Kγ
) 1
γ
(−Ω)
rg − rf
and λ > 1Kγ . As
(1− γ)E
(
U
(
C¯1, α¯
))
= −
kγ(−Ω)1−γ
1 + rf + w1
[
λ
1
γ −
(
1
Kγ
) 1
γ
]γ
(95)
42Note that for C¯1 < C¯
U,P2
1 is the denominator in (92) strictly positive. Note in addition that the right-hand-
side of (90) being below − (−Ω)
1−γ
1+rf+w1
kγλ is sufficient for E
(
U
(
Y1 +
Y2−C2L
1+rf
−
rf−rb
1+rf
α, α
))
< E
(
U
(
CP21 , α
P2
))
.
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then based on this and (86) it can be shown that for λ >
[
1+rf+w1
k +
(
1
Kγ
)1/γ]γ
(1− γ)E
(
U
(
C¯1, α¯
))
< (1− γ)E
(
U
(
CP21 , α
P2
))
Note that the maximum can not be reached at α = −Ωrg−rf , see (94).
Note that for C¯1 = C¯1
U,P2
there is the only feasible solution for (P2), namely(
C1 = C¯1 = C¯1
U,P2
, α = αC1=C¯1C2b=C2L
)
as αC1=C¯1C2b=C2L = α
C1=C¯1
C2g=C¯2
. Note in addition that C2g =
C¯2 = w0 + (w1 + w2)C¯1
U,P2
, C2b = C2L and
(1− γ)E
(
U
(
C¯1
U,P2
, αC1=C¯1C2b=C2L
))
= −λ δ(1 − p)
[
w0 + (w1 + w2)C¯1
U,P2
− C2L
]1−γ
= −λ δ(1 − p)(rg − rb)
1−γ
(
αC1=C¯1C2b=C2L
)1−γ
(96)
Note that this point is feasible also for (P4)–(P8).
Summary for (P2):
• For C¯1 ≤ C¯
U,P1
1 and λ > λ
P1−P2 problem (P1) exceeds (P2).
• For C¯U,P11 < C¯1 < C¯
U,P2
1 and λ > max
{
λP2, λP2−P2
}
is the maximum given by(
C1 = C
P2
1 , α = α
P2
)
, see (36) and (37).
• For C¯1 = C¯
U,P2
1 there is the only feasible solution for (P2), namely(
C1 = C¯
U,P2
1 , α = α
C1=C¯1
C2b=C2L
)
.
Problem (P4). Let C¯1 ≤ C¯
U,P2
1 . As
d2E(U)
dα2 > 0 then there is no local interior maximum,
which implies that the maximum will occur at the border. The cases under consideration are:
(i) C2g = C¯2, (ii) C2b = C¯2, (iii) C2b = C2L and (iv) C1 = C¯1. Note that the point implied by
case (i) is feasible for (P2) and the point implied by case (ii) is feasible for (P1).
Case (iii): C2b = C2L when C1 = Y1 +
Y2−C2L
1+rf
−
rf−rb
1+rf
α and
0 ≤ α ≤ α
C2g=C¯2
C2b=C2L
for C¯L,P41 ≤ C¯1 ≤ C¯
U,P2
1 (97)
where α
C2g=C¯2
C2b=C2L
is given by (54). It can be then seen that
(1− γ)E
(
U
(
Y1 +
Y2 −C2L
1 + rf
−
rf − rb
1 + rf
α, α
))
=
[
Y1 − C¯1 +
Y2 − C2L
1 + rf
−
rf − rb
1 + rf
α
]1−γ
− λδp
[
w0 + w1
(
Y1 +
Y2
1 + rf
)
+ w2C¯1 −
1 + rf + w1
1 + rf
C2L −
(
rg − rb +
rf − rb
1 + rf
w1
)
α
]1−γ
− λδ(1 − p)
[
w0 + w1
(
Y1 +
Y2
1 + rf
)
+ w2C¯1 −
1 + rf + w1
1 + rf
C2L −
w1(rf − rb)
1 + rf
α
]1−γ
(98)
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and thus
dE
(
U
(
Y1 +
Y2−C2L
1+rf
−
rf−rb
1+rf
, α
))
dα
= −
[
Y1 − C¯1 +
Y2 − C2L
1 + rf
−
rf − rb
1 + rf
α
]
−γ rf − rb
1 + rf
+ λδp
[
w0 + w1
(
Y1 +
Y2
1 + rf
)
+ w2C¯1 −
1 + rf + w1
1 + rf
C2L −
(
rg − rb +
rf − rb
1 + rf
w1
)
α
]
−γ
×
[
rg − rb +
rf − rb
1 + rf
w1
]
+ λδ(1 − p)
[
w0 + w1
(
Y1 +
Y2
1 + rf
)
+ w2C¯1 −
1 + rf + w1
1 + rf
C2L −
w1(rf − rb)
1 + rf
α
]
−γ w1(rf − rb)
1 + rf
(99)
≥ −
(
rf − rb
1 + rf
)1−γ (
αC1=C¯1C2b=C2L − α
C2g=C¯2
C2b=C2L
)
−γ
+λ δ
[
w0 + w1
(
Y1 − C¯1 +
Y2 − C2L
1 + rf
)
+ (w1 + w2)C¯1 − C2L
]
−γ w1(rf − rb)
1 + rf
(100)
which is positive and thus the objective function (98) is increasing, for
λ >
1
w1 δ

w0 + w1
(
Y1 − C¯1 +
Y2−C2L
1+rf
)
+ (w1 + w2)C¯1 − C2L
αC1=C¯1C2b=C2L − α
C2g=C¯2
C2b=C2L
1 + rf
rf − rb


γ
= λP4 (101)
This implies that the maximum of (98) is reached at α
C2g=C¯2
C2b=C2L
which is feasible for (P2) as
well and thus is not the maximum of the main problem (6).
For C¯1 = C¯
U,P2
1 is α
C1=C¯1
C2b=C2L
= α
C2g=C¯2
C2b=C2L
and thus the first derivative, as given by (100),
can be written as
dE
(
U
(
Y1 +
Y2−C2L
1+rf
−
rf−rb
1+rf
, α
))
dα
= −
(
rf − rb
1 + rf
)1−γ (
αC1=C¯1C2b=C2L − α
)
−γ
+ λδp
(
rg − rb +
rf − rb
1 + rf
w1
)1−γ (
αC1=C¯1C2b=C2L − α
)
−γ
+ λδ(1 − p)w1
(
rf − rb
1 + rf
)1−γ [(rg − rb)(1 + rf )
rf − rb
αC1=C¯1C2b=C2L
αC1=C¯1C2b=C2L − α
+ w1
]−γ (
αC1=C¯1C2b=C2L − α
)
−γ
which is positive and thus the objective function is increasing for
λ >
1
δ
×
1
p
[
(1+rf )(rg−rb)
rf−rb
+ w1
]1−γ
+ (1− p)w1
[
(1+rf )(rg−rb)
rf−rb
α
C1=C¯1
C2b=C2L
α
C1=C¯1
C2b=C2L
−α
+ w1
]
−γ = λ(α)
As λ(α) is an increasing function in α then for α ∈
[
0, αC1=C¯1C2b=C2L
]
is λ(α) ≤ λ
(
αC1=C¯1C2b=C2L
)
and
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thus it is sufficient for the objective function (98) with C¯1 = C¯
U,P2
1 to be increasing when
λ > λ
(
αC1=C¯1C2b=C2L
)
, i.e., when
λ >
1
δp
[
rf − rb
(1 + rf )(rg − rb) +w1(rf − rb)
]1−γ
= λ
(
αC1=C¯1C2b=C2L
)
= λP2−P4 (102)
Thus, for C¯1 = C¯
U,P2
1 and λ > λ
P2−P4 the maximum of the objective function (98) is reached
for α = αC1=C¯1C2b=C2L which is of the same value as the objective function of (P2) at its maximum,
see (96).
Case (iv): C1 = C¯1. Note that
C¯2−C2g = (1+ rf +w1)C¯1− (rg− rf )α− (1+ rf )Y1−Y2+w0+w2C¯1 = −Ω− (rg− rf)α ≥ 0
for α ≤ −Ωrg−rf for which is also C¯2−C2b nonnegative and C2b ≥ C2L for α ≤
(1+rf )(Y1−C¯1)+Y2−C2L
rf−rb
.
This inequality can not be satisfied for Ω > 0. When Ω = 0 then the only feasible solution
is
(
C¯U,P11 , 0
)
which is feasible also for (P1). Let C¯1 > C¯
U,P1
1 , i.e., Ω < 0, and note that the
objective function in this case is
(1− γ)E(U) = −λδp [−Ω− (rg − rf )α]
1−γ − λδ(1 − p) [−Ω+ (rf − rb)α]
1−γ (103)
where
0 ≤ α ≤
−Ω
rg − rf
= αC1=C¯1
C2g=C¯2
It can be seen that for C¯1 > C¯
U,P1
1 and E(r) > rf is the objective function (103) increasing
in α, so the maximum occurs at
(
C¯1, α
C1=C¯1
C2g=C¯2
)
. Note that point
(
C¯1, α
C1=C¯1
C2g=C¯2
)
is feasible for
(P2). Thus, the only relevant case (in terms of comparisons to other potential candidates for
maxima) in (P4) is case (iii).
Summary for (P4):
• For C¯L,P41 ≤ C¯1 < C¯
U,P2
1 and λ > λ
P4 is (P4) exceeded by (P1) or (P2).
• For C¯1 = C¯
U,P2
1 and λ > λ
P2−P4 the maximum of (P4) coincides with the maximum of
(P2) as given by (96).
Problem (P5). Let C¯1 ≤ C¯
U,P2
1 . Note that C2b ≥ C¯2 implies that C1 ≤ C¯1 +
Ω
1+rf+w1
.
It is easy to show that for any fixed C˜1 such that C1L ≤ C˜1 ≤ min
{
C¯1, C¯1 +
Ω
1+rf+w1
}
is the
expected utility of (P5) concave and its maximum is achieved at
α˜ =
1−K
1
γ
0
rf − rb +K
1
γ
0 (rg − rf )
[
Ω+ (1 + rf + w1)(C¯1 − C˜1)
]
(104)
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Note that (C˜1, α˜) is feasible for (P5). Thus, the candidates for the maximum of (P5) are
(C˜1, α˜) with C1L ≤ C˜1 ≤ min
{
C¯1, C¯1 +
Ω
1+rf+w1
}
and α˜ given by (104). By plugging this
point into the expected utility of (P5) we obtain (after some derivations)
(1− γ)E(U) = −λ
(
C¯1 − C˜1
)1−γ
+ λP1−P5
[
Ω
1 + rf + w1
+ C¯1 − C˜1
]1−γ
where
λP1−P5 =


k2
(
1 +K
1
γ
γ
)
1 + rf +w1


γ
=


k
(
1 +
(
1
Kγ
) 1
γ
)
1 + rf + w1


γ
It can be seen (after some derivations) that for C1L ≤ C¯1 ≤ C¯
U,P1
1 and any C˜1 ∈
[
C1L, C¯1
]
is the expected utility of (P5) given by (105) exceeded by the expected utility of (P1) at its
maximum given by (70) for λ ≥ λP1−P5, namely
−λ
(
C¯1 − C˜1
)1−γ
+ λP1−P5
[
Ω
1 + rf + w1
+ C¯1 − C˜1
]1−γ
≤ −
(
λ− λP1−P5
) (
C¯1 − C˜1
)1−γ
+λP1−P5
(
Ω
1 + rf + w1
)1−γ
<
(
Ω
1 + rf + w1
)1−γ [
1 +
(
λP1−P5
)1/γ]γ
= (1− γ)E
(
U
(
CP11 , α
P1
))
Let C¯U,P11 < C¯1 ≤ C¯
U,P2
1 . As
lim
C˜1→C1L
dE(U)
dC˜1
> 0 for λ > λP1−P5

(1 + rf + w1)(C¯1 − C1L)
w2
(
C¯U,P51 − C¯1
)


γ
= λP5
and
lim
C˜1→C¯1+
Ω
1+rf+w1
dE(U)
dC˜1
= −∞ < 0
then for λ > λP5 is the maximum reached at the stationary point
CP51 = C¯1 −
λ1/γ
λ1/γ − (λP1−P5)1/γ
×
−Ω
1 + rf + w1
=
λ1/γ
[
(1 + rf )Y1 + Y2 − w0 − w2C¯1
]
− (λP1−P5)1/γ(1 + rf + w1)C¯1[
λ1/γ − (λP1−P5)1/γ
]
(1 + rf + w1)
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Note that λP5 > λP1−P5. After plugging the stationary point CP51 into (104) we obtain
αP5 =
1−K
1/γ
0
rf − rb +K
1/γ
0 (rg − rf )
×
(λP1−P5)1/γ
λ1/γ − (λP1−P5)1/γ
× (−Ω) (105)
Thus the maximum of (P5) for λ > λP5 is reached at
(
CP51 , α
P5
)
with
(1− γ)E
(
U
(
CP51 , α
P5
))
= −
(
−Ω
1 + rf + w1
)1−γ [
λ1/γ − (λP1−P5)1/γ
]γ
(106)
It can be shown that for C¯U,P11 < C¯1 < min
{
C¯U,P21 , C¯
U,P5
1
}
is the maximum of (P5) below
the maximum of (P2), i.e.,
(1− γ)E
(
U
(
CP51 , α
P5
))
= −
(
−Ω
1 + rf + w1
)1−γ [
λ1/γ − (λP1−P5)1/γ
]γ
< −
(−Ω)1−γ
1 + rf + w1
[M(λ)− 1− rf − w1]
γ
= (1− γ)E
(
U
(
CP21 , α
P2
))
(107)
see (86), when k1+rf+w1 < 1 as inequality (107) boils down to
λ1/γ + 1 >
k
1 + rf + w1
(
λ1/γ + 1
)
Thus, for k1+rf+w1 = 1 both objective functions have the same value and for
k
1+rf+w1
> 1
(P5) at its maximum exceeds (P2) at its maximum. Note finally that k1+rf+w1 < 1 when
δ <
1
1− p
[
rg − rf
(1 + rf + w1)(rg − rb)
]1−γ
= δP2−P5
k
1+rf+w1
= 1 when δ = δP2−P5 and k1+rf+w1 > 1 when δ > δ
P2−P5.
Note that for C¯1 = C¯
U,P2
1 is the maximum of (P5) as given by (106) for λ > λ
P5 below
the maximum of (P2), which is the value of its objective function at its only feasible solution
when
(1− γ)E
(
U
(
CP51 , α
P5
))
= −
(
−Ω
1 + rf + w1
)1−γ [
λ1/γ − (λP1−P5)1/γ
]γ
≤ −λ δ(1 − p)
[
w0 + (w1 + w2)C¯
U,P2
1 − C2L
]1−γ
= (1− γ)E
(
U
(
C¯U,P21 , α
C1=C¯1
C2b=C2L
))
(108)
This holds for any λ > λP5 and δ ≤ δP2−P5
[
1−
(
λP1−P5
λ
)1/γ]γ
= δ(λ)P2−P5
C¯1=C¯
U,P2
1
. On the
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other hand, the maximum of (P5) exceeds the maximum of (P2) when δ > δ(λ)P2−P5
C¯1=C¯
U,P2
1
.
Summary for (P5):
• For C1L < C¯1 ≤ C¯
U,P1
1 (P1) exceeds (P5) for λ ≥ λ
P1−P5.
• The following holds for for C¯U,P11 < C¯1 < min
{
C¯U,P21 , C¯
U,P5
1
}
and λ > max
{
λP2, λP2−P2, λP5
}
:
– (P2) at its maximum exceeds (P5) at its maximum when δ < δP2−P5,
– (P5) at its maximum coincides with (P2) at its maximum when δ = δP2−P5 and
– (P5) at its maximum exceeds (P2) at its maximum when δ > δP2−P5.
• The following holds for C¯1 = C¯
U,P2
1 ≤ C¯
U,P5
1 and λ > λ
P5:
– (P2) at its maximum exceeds (P5) at its maximum when δ < δ(λ)P2−P5
C¯1=C¯
U,P2
1
,
– (P2) at its maximum coincides with (P5) at its maximum when δ = δ(λ)P2−P5
C¯1=C¯
U,P2
1
and
– (P2) at its maximum is below (P5) at its maximum when δ > δ(λ)P2−P5
C¯1=C¯
U,P2
1
.
Problem (P6). Let C¯1 ≤ C¯
U,P2
1 . We show at first that there is no interior local maximum
or minimum for (P6) which implies that the maximum will occur at the border of the set of
feasible solutions for (P6). Then we check all potential feasible solutions at the border.
The first order conditions are
dE(U)
dC1
= λ(C¯1 − C1)
−γ −δp
[
Ω− (1 + rf + w1)(C1 − C¯1) + (rg − rf )α
]
−γ
(1 + rf + w1)
−λδ(1 − p)
[
(1 + rf + w1)(C1 − C¯1)− Ω+ (rf − rb)α
]
−γ
(1 + rf +w1 + w1)
= 0
dE(U)
dα = δp
[
Ω− (1 + rf + w1)(C1 − C¯1) + (rg − rf )α
]
−γ
(rg − rf )
−λδ(1 − p)
[
(1 + rf + w1)(C1 − C¯1)− Ω+ (rf − rb)α
]
−γ
(rf − rb) = 0


(109)
dE(U)
dα = 0 from (109) implies the expression for α given by (79). Note that α is feasible only
for Ω ≤ 0 where for Ω = 0 there is only one feasible solution, namely (C¯1, 0) which is feasible
also for (P1). Thus, assume that Ω < 0 and let’s plug (79) into the C1 part of the FOC in
(109). After some simplifications we obtain
λ
1
γ
[
(1 + rf + w1)(C1 − C¯1)− Ω
]
= (C¯1 − C1)M(λ)
which gives
C+1 = C¯1 +
Ω
M(λ)
λ
1
γ
+ 1 + rf + w1
(110)
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In addition, after plugging C+1 from (110) into (79) we obtain
α+ =
k
rg − rf
[(
1
K0
) 1
γ
+ λ
1
γ
]
−Ω
M(λ) + λ
1
γ (1 + rf + w1)
Next we show that the expected utility function is indifferent at (C+1 , α
+), namely, we show
that at (C+1 , α
+) are d
2
E(U)
dα2 < 0, and D3 ≡ ∇
2
E(U(C1, C2)) =
d2E(U)
dC21
d2E(U)
dα2 −
(
d2E(U)
dC1dα
)2
< 0.
Note that
C+2g − C¯2 = k
−Ω
M(λ) + λ
1
γ (1 + rf +w1)
rg − rb
rg − rf
(
1
K0
) 1
γ
(111)
C¯2 − C
+
2b = k
−Ω
M(λ) + λ
1
γ (1 + rf + w1)
rg − rb
rg − rf
λ
1
γ (112)
and thus C¯2 − (C
+
2b) = (K0λ)
1
γ ((C+2g) − C¯2). Using (109), (111) and (112) we obtain the
following
1
γ
d2E(U)
dC21
|(C+1 ,α+)
=
[
−Ω
M(λ) + λ
1
γ (1 + rf + w1)
]
−1−γ
×
[
λ
−
1
γ +
1 + rf + w1
k
(
rg − rf
rg − rb
)2(
λ
−
1
γ −K
1
γ
0
rf − rb
rg − rf
)]
(113)
1
γ
d2E(U)
dα2
|(C+1 ,α+)
=
(rf − rb)
2
k (1 + rf + w1)
(
rg − rf
rg − rb
)2 [ −Ω
M(λ) + λ
1
γ (1 + rf + w1)
]
−1−γ (
λ−
1
γ −K
1
γ
γ
)
(114)
1
γ
d2E(U)
dC1dα
|(C+1 ,α+)
=
rf − rb
k
(
rg − rf
rg − rb
)2 [ −Ω
M(λ) + λ
1
γ (1 + rf + w1)
]
−1−γ (
λ
−
1
γ +K
1
γ
0
)
Note that (114) and λ > 1Kγ implies that
d2E(U)
dα2 |(C+1 ,α+)
< 0. In addition,
1
γ2
[
−Ω
M(λ) + λ
1
γ (1 + rf + w1)
]2(1+γ)
D =
[
λ
−
1
γ +
1 + rf
k
(
rg − rf
rg − rb
)2(
λ
−
1
γ −
rf − rb
rg − rf
K
1
γ
0
)]
×
(rf − rb)
2
k(1 + rf + w1)
(
rg − rf
rg − rb
)2 [
λ
−
1
γ −K
1
γ
γ
]
−
(
rf − rb
k
)2(rg − rf
rg − rb
)4(
λ−
1
γ +K
1
γ
0
)2
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where D = ∇2E(U(C1, C2))(C+1 ,α+)
= d
2
E(U)
dC21
d2E(U)
dα2
−
(
d2E(U)
dC1dα
)2 ∣∣
(C+1 ,α
+)
. Thus,
1
γ2
[
−Ω
M(λ) + λ
1
γ (1 + rf + w1)
]2(1+γ) (
rg − rb
rg − rf
)2( k
rf − rb
)2
D =
λ
−
1
γ
1 + rf + w1
[
λ−
1
γ −K
1
γ
γ
]
−λ−
1
γK
1
γ
γ < 0
for λ > 1Kγ which gives that D = ∇
2
E(U(C1, C2)) =
d2E(U)
dC21
d2E(U)
dα2
−
(
d2E(U)
dC1dα
)2
< 0. From
(114) it follows that d
2
E(U)
dα2 |(C+1 ,α+)
≥ 0 for λ ≤ 1Kγ and thus (C
+
1 , α
+
1 ) can not be a point of
local maxima for any λ > 1 and thus the maximum will occur at the border.
The feasible solutions at the border for (P6) that come into consideration are given by:
(i) C2g = C¯2, (ii) C2b = C¯2, (iii) C2b = C2L, (iv) C1 = C¯1 and (v) C1 = C1L.
Case (i): C2g = C¯2 when
C1 =
1
1 + rf + w1
[
(1 + rf )Y1 + Y2 − w0 − w2C¯1 + (rg − rf )α
]
= C¯1 +
Ω+ (rg − rf )α
1 + rf + w1
and
max
{
0, αC1=C1L
C2g=C¯2
}
≤ α ≤ min
{
αC1=C¯1
C2g=C¯2
=
−Ω
rg − rf
, α
C2g=C¯2
C2b=C2L
}
Note that this case can occur only for Ω ≤ 0, i.e., for C¯1 ≥ C¯
U,P1
1 ,
43 where in the case of
Ω = 0 the only feasible solutions is (C¯1, 0). Thus, in the following we assume that C¯
U,P1
1 <
C¯1 ≤ C¯
U,P2
1 . It can be seen that
(1− γ)E
(
U
(
C¯1 +
Ω+ (rg − rf )α
1 + rf + w1
, α
))
= −λ
[
−Ω− (rg − rf )α
1 + rf + w1
]1−γ
−λδ(1 − p)(rg − rb)
1−γα1−γ
is a convex function in α and thus its maximum is reached either at α = 0, when C1L ≤
C¯1 +
Ω
1+rf+w1
, or at α = αC1=C1L
C2g=C¯2
, when C¯1 +
Ω
1+rf+w1
≤ C1L ≤ C¯1, or at α = α
C1=C¯1
C2g=C¯2
or at
α
C2g=C¯2
C2b=C2L
. Thus, the potential candidates for the maximum in this case are
(a)
(
C1 = C¯1 +
Ω
1+rf+w1
, α = 0
)
when C1L ≤ C¯1 +
Ω
1+rf+w1
or
(b)
(
C1 = C1L, α = α
C1=C1L
C2g=C¯2
)
when C¯1+
Ω
1+rf+w1
≤ C1L ≤ C¯1 and C¯
U,P5
1 ≤ C¯1 ≤ C¯
U,P6
1 or
(c)
(
C1 = C¯1, α = α
C1=C¯1
C2g=C¯2
)
when C¯U,P11 < C¯1 ≤ C¯
U,P2
1 or
(d)
(
C1 = C¯1 +
Ω+(rg−rf )α
C2g=C¯2
C2b=C2L
1+rf+w1
, α = α
C2g=C¯2
C2b=C2L
)
when C¯U,P21 ≤ C¯1 ≤ C¯
U,P6
1
43Note that α
C2g=C¯2
C2b=C2L
≥ 0 when C¯1 ≥ C¯
L,P4
1 and condition (63) guarantees that C1L ≥ C¯
L,P4
1 .
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Note that the point in case (a) is feasible also for (P5), when C¯1 ≤ min
{
C¯U,P21 , C¯
U,P5
1
}
and
is also the only feasible solution for case (ii).
Based on Lemma 1-(vi), case (b) is relevant, i.e., αC1=C1L
C2g=C¯2
≥ 0, only for C¯U,P51 ≤ C¯1 ≤
C¯U,P61 which we do not consider here. The point in case (c) is a feasible solution for (P2).
Case (d) holds only for C¯U,P21 ≤ C¯1 ≤ C¯
U,P6
1 which is not considered here.
Case (iii). C2b = C2L when C1 = Y1 +
Y2−C2L
1+rf
−
rf−rb
1+rf
α for
αC1=C¯1C2b=C2L ≤ α ≤ α
C1=C1L
C2b=C2L
(115)
where αC1=C¯1C2b=C2L =
(1+rf )(Y1−C¯1)+Y2−C2L
rf−rb
and αC1=C1LC2b=C2L =
(1+rf )(Y1−C1L)+Y2−C2L
rf−rb
. Then
(1− γ)E
(
U
(
Y1 +
Y2 −C2L
1 + rf
−
rf − rb
1 + rf
α, α
))
= −λ
[
C¯1 − Y1 −
Y2 −C2L
1 + rf
+
rf − rb
1 + rf
α
]1−γ
+ δp
[
1 + rf +w1
1 + rf
C2L −w0 − w1
(
Y1 +
Y2
1 + rf
)
− w2C¯1 +
(
rg − rb +
rf − rb
1 + rf
w1
)
α
]1−γ
− λδ(1 − p)
[
w0 + w1
(
Y1 +
Y2
1 + rf
)
+ w2C¯1 −
1 + rf + w1
1 + rf
C2L −
w1(rf − rb)
1 + rf
α
]1−γ
(116)
Note that
1
γ
d2E
(
U
(
Y1 +
Y2−C2L
1+rf
−
rf−rb
1+rf
α, α
))
dα2
= λ
[
C¯1 − Y1 −
Y2 − C2L
1 + rf
+
rf − rb
1 + rf
α
]
−1−γ (rf − rb
1 + rf
)2
− δp
[
1 + rf +w1
1 + rf
C2L −w0 − w1
(
Y1 +
Y2
1 + rf
)
− w2C¯1 +
(
rg − rb +
rf − rb
1 + rf
w1
)
α
]
−1−γ
×
(
rg − rb +
rf − rb
1 + rf
w1
)2
+ λδ(1 − p)
[
w0 + w1
(
Y1 +
Y2
1 + rf
)
+ w2C¯1 −
1 + rf + w1
1 + rf
C2L −
w1(rf − rb)
1 + rf
α
]
−1−γ (rf − rb
1 + rf
w1
)2
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≥ λ
[
C¯1 − Y1 −
Y2 − C2L
1 + rf
+
rf − rb
1 + rf
αC1=C1LC2b=C2L
]
−1−γ (rf − rb
1 + rf
)2
− δp
[
1 + rf +w1
1 + rf
C2L −w0 − w1
(
Y1 +
Y2
1 + rf
)
− w2C¯1 +
(
rg − rb +
rf − rb
1 + rf
w1
)
αC1=C¯1C2b=C2L
]
−1−γ
×
(
rg − rb +
rf − rb
1 + rf
w1
)2
+ λδ(1 − p)
[
w0 + w1
(
Y1 +
Y2
1 + rf
)
+ w2C¯1 −
1 + rf + w1
1 + rf
C2L −
w1(rf − rb)
1 + rf
αC1=C¯1C2b=C2L
]
−1−γ
×
(
rf − rb
1 + rf
w1
)2
= λ
(
C¯1 − C1L
)
−1−γ
(
rf − rb
1 + rf
)2
− δp
[
Ω+ (rg − rf )α
C1=C¯1
C2b=C2L
]
−1−γ
(
rg − rb +
rf − rb
1 + rf
w1
)2
+λδ(1− p)
[
w0 + (w1 + w2)C¯1 − C2L
]
−1−γ
(
rf − rb
1 + rf
w1
)2
(117)
It is sufficient for the objective function (116) to be convex if the right-hand-side of the last
expression is positive which is guaranteed for
λ >
δp
(
(1+rf )(rg−rb)
rf−rb
+w1
)2
[
Ω+(rg−rf )α
C1=C¯1
C2b=C2L
]1+γ
1
(C¯1−C1L)1+γ
+
δ(1−p)w21
[w0+(w1+w2)C¯1−C2L]
1+γ
=
δp
[
(rg−rb)(1+rf )
rf−rb
+ w1
]2
[
Ω+ (rg − rf )α
C1=C¯1
C2b=C2L
]1+γ ×
(
C¯1 − C1L
)1+γ [
w0 + (w1 + w2)C¯1 − C2L
]1+γ
δ(1 − p)w21
(
C¯1 − C1L
)1+γ
+
[
w0 + (w1 + w2)C¯1 − C2L
]1+γ
= λP2−P6 (118)
Thus the maximum occurs at one of the end points α = αC1=C¯1C2b=C2L or α = α
C1=C1L
C2b=C2L
. Note
that α = αC1=C¯1C2b=C2L is feasible for (P2) and α = α
C1=C1L
C2b=C2L
is tackled in case (v) where it is
shown that it is exceeded by another point which is feasible for (P5).
For C¯1 = C¯
U,P2
1 is the first derivative of the objective function (116) given by
dE
(
U
(
Y1 +
Y2−C2L
1+rf
−
rf−rb
1+rf
, α
))
dα
= −λ
(
rf − rb
1 + rf
)1−γ (
α− αC1=C¯1C2b=C2L
)
−γ
+ δp
(
rg − rb +
rf − rb
1 + rf
w1
)1−γ (
α− αC1=C¯1C2b=C2L
)
−γ
+ λ δ(1 − p)w1
(
rf − rb
1 + rf
)1−γ [(rg − rb)(1 + rf )
rf − rb
αC1=C¯1C2b=C2L
α− αC1=C¯1C2b=C2L
− w1
]−γ (
α− αC1=C¯1C2b=C2L
)
−γ
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while using Lemma 1 (iv). Sufficient conditions for
dE
(
U
(
Y1+
Y2−C2L
1+rf
−
rf−rb
1+rf
, α
))
dα < 0 and thus
for the objective function being decreasing are
λ >
p
1
δ −
1
δP2−P6
[
(1 + rf )(rg − rb)
rf − rb
+ w1
]1−γ
= λP2−P6
C¯1=C¯
U,P2
1
and
δ < δP2−P6 =
1
(1− p)w1
(
rg − rb
C¯U,P21 − C1L
αC1=C¯1C2b=C2L − w1
)γ
(119)
Thus, for C¯1 = C¯
U,P2
1 , δ < δ
P2−P6 and λ > λP2−P6
C¯1=C¯
U,P2
1
the maximum of the objective function
(116) is reached for α = αC1=C¯1C2b=C2L which is of the same value as the objective function of (P2)
at its maximum, see (96).
In case (iv) any feasible solution is also feasible for (P2) and thus this case can occur only
for C¯1 ≤ C¯
U,P2
1 .
Case (v). C1 = C1L for α
C1=C1L
C2b=C¯2
≤ α ≤ αC1=C1LC2b=C2L , see (56), (60) and Lemma 1-(vi). Then
(1− γ)E (U (C1L, α)) = −λ(C¯1 − C1L)
1−γ
+δp
[
(1 + rf )(Y1 − C1L) + Y2 − w0 − w1C1L − w2C¯1 + (rg − rf )α
]1−γ
−λδ(1 − p)
[
w0 + w1C1L + w2C¯1 − (1 + rf )(Y1 − C1L)− Y2 + (rf − rb)α
]1−γ
It can be shown that for C¯1 ≤ C¯
U,P2
1 and λ ≥
1
Kγ
is the objective function of case (v)
decreasing and thus the maximum is reached at α = αC1=C1L
C2b=C¯2
which is feasible also for (P5).
The value of the expected utility function at this point is as follows
(1− γ)E
(
U
(
C1L, α
C1=C1L
C2b=C¯2
))
= −λ(C¯1 − C1L)
1−γ + δp
[
rg − rb
rf − rb
w2
(
C¯U,P51 − C¯1
)]1−γ
(120)
Summary for (P6): Let λ > 1Kγ . Then the following holds.
• For C¯1L < C¯1 < C¯
U,P2
1 and λ > λ
P2−P6 (P2) exceeds (P6).
• For C¯1 = C¯
U,P2
1 , δ < δ
P2−P6 and λ > λP2−P6
C¯1=C¯
U,P2
1
(P2) exceeds (P6).
Note that the above mentioned conditions are sufficient, not necessary.
Problem (P8). Let C¯U,P11 ≤ C¯1 ≤ C¯
U,P2
1 . As the utility function of (P8) is convex a
maximum will occur at the border of the set of feasible solutions. The feasible solutions
at the border that come into consideration are: (i) C2g = C¯2, (ii) C2b = C¯2 = C2g, (iii)
C2g = C2L = C2b, (iv) C2b = C2L, (v) C1 = C¯1 and (vi) C1 = C1L.
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Case (i) is feasible for (P6) and was already dealt with in the proof of (P6) in case (i) and
thus C¯1 ≤ C¯
U,P6
1 . The only feasible solution in case (ii) is
(
C1 = C
P5
1 = C¯1 +
Ω
1+rf+w1
, α = αP5 = 0
)
which is also feasible (and thus dealt with) for (P5) and (P6).
The only feasible solution in case (iii) when C2g = C2L = C2b is
(
C1 = Y1 +
Y2−C2L
1+rf
, α = 0
)
which is feasible only for C¯1 ≥ Y1 +
Y2−C2L
1+rf
.
Case (iv): C2b = C2L when C1 = Y1 +
Y2−C2L
1+rf
−
rf−rb
1+rf
α and
max
{
0, αC1=C¯1C2b=C2L
}
≤ α ≤ min
{
α
C2g=C¯2
C2b=C2L
, αC1=C1LC2b=C2L
}
where α
C2g=C¯2
C2b=C2L
is given by (54), αC1=C¯1C2b=C2L =
(1+rf )(Y1−C¯1)+Y2−C2L
rf−rb
and αC1=C1LC2b=C2L =
(1+rf )(Y1−C1L)+Y2−C2L
rf−rb
.
Note that for C¯1 < C¯
U,P2
1 is α
C1=C¯1
C2b=C2L
> α
C2g=C¯2
C2b=C2L
and thus case (iv) has no feasible solu-
tion. Note in addition that the only feasible solution for C¯1 = C¯
U,P2
1 is α = α
C1=C¯1
C2b=C2L
as
αC1=C¯1C2b=C2L = α
C2g=C¯2
C2b=C2L
which coincides with the value of (P2) at its maximum, see (96).
If C1 = C¯, case (v), then any feasible solution will be feasible also for (P4). For more
details in the proof see case (iv) of (P4).
If C1 = C1L, case (vi), then
(1− γ)E(U(C1L, α)) = − λ(C¯1 − C1L)
1−γ − λδp
[
−Ω− (1 + rf + w1)(C¯1 − C1L)− (rg − rf )α
]1−γ
− λδ(1 − p)
[
−Ω− (1 + rf + w1)(C¯1 − C1L) + (rf − rb)α
]1−γ
(121)
for
0 ≤ α ≤ min
{
αC1=C1L
C2g=C¯2
, αC1=C1LC2b=C2L
}
where αC1=C1L
C2g=C¯2
is given by (59) and αC1=C1LC2b=C2L is given by (56). Based on Lemma 1-(vi) is
αC1=C1L
C2g=C¯2
< 0 and thus (121) is infeasible.
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